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ABSTRACT

The 1974 Educational Testing Service (ETS) Measurement Award was presented to J.P. Guilford at the ETS Invitational Conference. Irving Kristol, in "Moral and Ethical Development in a Democratic Society," called for the restoration of authority within our major social institutions, especially schools. Martin Trow examined the effects of the college experience, in "Higher Education and Moral Development." A lawyer's professional responsibilities were discussed by Murray L. Schwartz, in "Moral Development, Ethics, and the Professional Education of Lawyers." Gunnar Myrdal spoke on "Educational Reform in Underdeveloped Countries." Jane Loevinger described an ability development model, a profile model, and a stage-sequence model in "Issues in the Measurement of Moral Development." In "The Role of the School in Moral Development," Wilson Riles concludes that ambitious attempts at character education during the past 50 years have yielded questionable results, and offers suggestions for improvement. (BW)

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MORAL DEVELOPMENT

TM006 924

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1974
ETS INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE

EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE

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ETS INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE

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SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

The thirty-fifth ETS Invitational Conference, sponsored by Educational Testing Service, was held at the New York Hilton, New York City, on November 2, 1974.

Chairman: WAYNE H. HOLTZMAN
President, Hogg Foundation for
Mental Health and Hogg Professor
of Psychology and Education
University of Texas at Austin

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Foreword

In recent years, as measurement has been increasingly involved in a broad spectrum of educational and social issues, the annual Invitational Conference on Testing Problems has focused its attention more and more on analyses of the issues themselves as well as the testing techniques applicable to them. In 1974, in recognition of this broader scope, we decided to drop the words "on Testing Problems" and organize the meeting under the simpler and less restrictive title of the "Invitational Conference."

The theme of the 1974 Conference was Moral Development. Speakers examined concepts of moral leadership, some professional and ethical questions, moral awareness in higher education, as well as the technical problems of measuring moral development and the role of the public schools in fostering it. We could not have asked for a more provocative or appropriate theme or more stimulating speakers.

I should like to thank Dr. Wayne Holtzman who, as Chairman of this particularly exciting Conference, was responsible for bringing together speakers and theme. We are also most grateful to Dr. Gunnar Myrdal for his stimulating and insightful luncheon speech. It was a memorable first Invitational Conference.

William W. Turnbull
PRESIDENT

Wayne H. Holtzman

Preface

Over the past 35 years, Educational Testing Service has established an enviable reputation by organizing and supporting its annual Invitational Conference on Testing Problems. Technical problems in test development, policy issues concerning the use of tests, recent trends in new technology, and the assessment of educational change are but a few of the recent topics dealing with measurement and evaluation in education. The last conference stressed the importance of the individual and measurement problems related to self-understanding and personal development. The theme of the 1974 Invitational Conference is a further departure from an emphasis upon testing problems.

Moral development is a topic of wide interest throughout society. In past generations, when the dominant values and moral precepts of the educated classes constituted a shared consensus, no one questioned the authority of schools to teach the values, attitudes, and moral behavior commonly accepted by the majority of citizens. For the past several decades, however, the public schools have retreated from deliberate moral education, recognizing the rights of the individual to his own beliefs and the pluralistic nature of society. But in recent years, there has been a return to the basic questions concerning the role of education in the moral development of the individual.

During the same period, there has been a renewed interest on the part of psychologists, philosophers, and educators in the nature of moral development within the growing child. A major address at the 1973 Invitational Conference concerned the development of moral stages, its uses and abuses, by Professor Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University. Together with Fenton of Carnegie-Mellon University, Kohlberg has been developing moral dilemma lessons that can be incorporated into the school curriculum. An increasing concern among educators for affective education dealing with values, interests, and attitudes is also apparent.

The rise of the counterculture movement in the late 60s and the subsequent heightened concern with moral issues and the conduct of society's leaders is particularly fresh in the minds of everyone. For these reasons, the participants for the 1974 Invitational Conference have been drawn from a much broader band of expertise than any of the previous conferences. Indeed, most of the speakers are outside the field of psychology and education.

Irving Kristol opened the conference with a ringing call for restoration of authority (but not authoritarianism) within our major social institutions, particularly the schools. He extended the ideas of Edmund Burke that absence of obligation means a diminution of humanity, and that moral deprivation results when no obligations are imposed.

Martin Trow stressed the moral issue of understanding negative evidence in the search for truth and discovery within our universities. Moral development occurs as a by-product of teaching whereby the teacher provides a model by adhering to the moral imperatives of intellectual disciplines and the joys of discovery and analysis. He cautioned that the lack of quantitative measures of the impact of college upon individual development should not be misinterpreted as meaning the college has no impact.

Murray Schwartz brought a fresh perspective to the conference in his revealing discussion of moral dilemmas confronting lawyers and their professional educators. The total client-commitment model, which asserts that a lawyer should do everything for his client that is lawful even to the extent of taking unfair advantage of the client's adversary, has dominated law practice in the past. But this standard is being challenged strongly within law schools, professional societies, and the public arena. While Dean Schwartz raises important issues that account for the ambivalence and confusion of the American public concerning the roles and behavior of lawyers, he has no clear solutions to offer for the resolution of these dilemmas.

Gunnar Myrdal, the distinguished Nobel Laureate, touched on some of these same issues in a sweeping review of the shortcomings of educational systems in underdeveloped countries. His luncheon address set the stage for a more detailed examination of the measurement of moral development and the role of public schools, the topics of the afternoon session.

Jane Loevinger presented a critical analysis of three competing models of moral development and their implications for measuring moral maturity. Traditional psychometric methods would be appropriate only for the ability model in which moral growth would be measured as proportionate achievement of an adult norm, or for the profile model which is a multivariate version of the same concept. Measurement in the stage-sequence model of Piaget and Kohlberg involves matching a particular response to a sequence of qualitative descriptions of the stage structures and their manifestations rather than counting the number of right answers. Loevinger provides detailed suggestions for measurement using the stage-sequence model. She also stresses the close interrelationship of moral

development, interpersonal development, development of self-concept and inner life as a single integrated structure.

Wilson Riles reviewed the role of the schools in moral development during the past 50 years and concluded that ambitious attempts at character education have yielded questionable results at best. The teaching of moral values as copybook maxims is not the role the school should play in moral development. At the same time, the school cannot be a value-neutral purveyor of cognitive skills, leaving moral education to the family, church, and community. He states that the school must take responsibility for the transmission of a unifying set of values for a diverse society as well as the teaching of values concerning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual. He offers four suggestions for improving the moral climate of the classroom and accelerating the moral development of children.

These six presentations and the lively discussion that followed covered a wide range of topics and conflicting points of view concerning the nature of moral development, the predominant educational philosophies in our schools, the distinctions between cognitive understanding of moral dilemmas and actual conduct, the issues of measurement in the study of moral development, and the choice of criteria for validating theories and techniques. While there may be some disappointed participants who came searching for simple answers to pressing questions or new solutions to perceived moral crises in society, the great majority were highly stimulated and richly rewarded by the variety of fresh viewpoints and the penetrating analyses of difficult issues that characterized the presentations and discussion of a most timely topic in America today.

Wayne H. Holtzman
CHAIRMAN

J. P. Guilford

EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE

Measurement Award 1974

J. P. GUILFORD

The ETS Award for Distinguished Service to Measurement was established in 1970, to be presented annually to an individual whose work and career have had a major impact on developments in educational and psychological measurement. The 1974 Award was presented at the Conference by ETS President William W. Turnbull to Professor J.P. Guilford with the following citation:

> The work of J.P. Guilford spans four decades and much of modern psychology. In an age of specialization, he has excelled in numerous fields. His contributions have illuminated areas of experimental psychology, personality theory and measurement, statistical psychology, and the definition and measurement of mental abilities.
>
> Throughout his distinguished career, Professor Guilford has contributed extensively to the literature in psychology as author, co-author, or editor of books, monographs, and articles in professional journals. His major works, *Psychometric Methods* and *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education*, have provided direction for important developments in factor analysis, psychophysical methods, scaling, and test theory. His writings on factor analysis are outstanding reference works for research psychologists throughout the world.
>
> A man of integrity, fairness, and personal warmth, Professor Guilford has always been held in the highest esteem by his colleagues and students. Over the years, he has been elected to the presidency of several professional organizations, among them the American Psychological Association and the Psychometric Society.
>
> As a dedicated scientist, he has persistently encouraged the use of experimental logic to enhance the power of factor analysis and psychometric theory. As a teacher, he has stimulated scores of students to follow his search for a fuller understanding of human behavior.
>
> In recognition of a lifetime of dedication and service that has had a major impact on educational and psychological measurement, ETS is pleased to present its 1974 Award for Distinguished Service to Measurement to J.P. Guilford.

Previous Recipients of the ETS Measurement Award

1970 E. F. Lindquist
1971 Lee J. Cronbach
1972 Robert L. Thorndike
1973 Oscar K. Buros

Morning Session

Moral and Ethical Development in a Democratic Society

IRVING KRISTOL
Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New York University and Co-editor of The Public Interest

I have been asked to speak about "Moral and Ethical Development in a Democratic Society," and I should like to begin by taking as my text a long report that appeared in the September 2 issue of *The New York Times* this year. Under the heading "A Coed Camp That's Run Like a Mountain Resort," the reporter gives us a glowing account of Camp Keowa, New York—a camp for 200 teen-age boys and girls run by the high school division of the Boy Scouts of America. It is a quite radical departure from the Boy Scout camps of yesteryear. There are no uniforms, and no bugles are blown for reveille—because, the reporter explains, "Teenagers are too sophisticated for that kind of stuff these days." The campers go to bed when they please, rise when they please, and pass the day as they please. The only rules are no drugs, no liquor, and no coed showers. According to the *Times*, the kids absolutely loved this new kind of camp, and the final paragraph of the story consists of the following enthusiastic endorsement by one of the campers:

> "The best part of all was that we didn't have to clean up our cabins," said Edward Meyer, 16, of Brooklyn, who spent much of his time at camp playing poker and wound up winning $50. "Our floor was covered with garbage. And nobody made us pick it up."

Mind you, this is a Boy Scout camp, and—as we all know—the Boy Scouts have always had it as their overriding aim to promote the moral development of young people. Presumably, Camp Keowa is engaged in this task and, according to the *Times* reporter, the young people interviewed, and the camp officials quoted, it is having an extraordinary success. True, the floors of the cabins seem to be covered with garbage. But is that any real cause for concern? What has garbage to do with moral development?

I think that's a very interesting question, and not at all a merely rhetorical one. Most of us who are middle-aged were, after all, raised to think

that there was indeed some kind of connection between the people's garbage and the people's morals. Were we wrong? Were we, as the *Times* suggests, a generation that suffered from a deficiency of sophistication? It seems to me that the question is worth exploring, and I can think of no better way to begin than by lingering over that word in the title of the subject which has been given me—the word "development."

Letting Morality Happen

"Development" is such a curious word, so tantalizingly neutral and therefore so ambiguous in defining our relation to morality. After all, the title could easily have been "Moral and Ethical Education in a Democratic Society." Why wasn't it? Well, I assume the reason is that the sponsors of this conference were not all certain that it is a proper function of education to shape young people according to any specific set of moral standards; and the phrase "moral education" does imply an activity of that sort. The term "development," on the other hand, suggests that morality is something that exists embryonically within every child—rather like an intelligence quotient—and that education can be satisfied by encouraging it to unfold toward its fullest potentiality. "Morality," in this view, is something that *happens* to one. And education then becomes a process of "liberating" human possibilities for this eventual happening rather than of defining human possibilities in an approved way.

This is certainly a very convenient notion for a teacher, or for anyone in a position of authority, because it means that he (or she) need not himself have any firm moral beliefs, to say nothing of providing a moral model of any kind. The process of "development" can then be regarded as a purely technical problem—a problem of means, not of ends—and the "solution" is to get people (young people, especially) to have feelings about morality and to think about morality: to be morally sensitive and "morally aware," as we say. Once this has been successfully accomplished, the task of education is finished. What kinds of people emerge from this process is something we can leave to the people themselves freely to decide; the final disposition of their moral sentiments and ideas is their business, not anyone else's.

It's all very odd and most interesting. It's rather as if an expert in gardening were to compose a manual on "Botanical Development in a Suburban Landscape." He would then give you all sorts of important information on how things grow—weeds as well as flowers, poison ivy as

well as rose gardens—without ever presuming to tell you whether you should favor one over the other, or *how* to favor one over the other. In fact, there are no such gardening manuals—precisely because any gardener will indeed have some definite ideas as to what a garden might look like. Different gardeners will have different ideas, of course; but there will be a limit to this variety. The idea of a garden does not, for instance, include an expanse of weeds or of poison ivy. And no gardener would ever confuse a garden with a garbage dump.

In contrast, we seem unable or unwilling to establish defining limits to the idea of a moral person. We are, as it were, gardeners with all the latest implements and technology, but without an idea of a garden, and unable even to distinguish between a garden and a garbage dump. Is this a function of mere ignorance? Or mere timidity? I think not. Rather, we have a kind of faith in the nature of people that we do not have in the botanical processes of nature itself—and I use the word "faith" in its full religious force. We really do believe that all human beings have a natural *telos* toward becoming flowers, not weeds or poison ivy, and that aggregates of human beings have a natural predisposition to arrange themselves into gardens, not jungles or garbage heaps. This sublime and noble faith we may call the religion of liberal humanism. It is the dominant spiritual and intellectual orthodoxy in America today. Indeed, despite all our chatter about the separation of church and state, one can even say it is the official religion of American society today, against which all other religions can be criticized as divisive and parochial.

I happen not to be a believer in this religion of liberal humanism, but this is not the time or place for theological controversy and I am not, in any case, the best qualified person for such a controversy. What I want to point to, and what I wish to discuss, is the *political and social crisis* which this religion of liberal humanism is evidently provoking. I shall not try to controvert the liberal-humanist thesis that there is no superior knowledge available as to how people should be morally shaped, nor shall I try to disprove the thesis that the people will, if left alone, shape themselves better than anyone or anything can shape them. I shall simply remark what I take to be a fact: Though the majority of the American people may well subscribe to some version of this religion—and I think they do—they end up holding in contempt all the institutions in which the ethos of this religion is incarnated. Indeed, and incredibly enough, they become increasingly "alienated" from these institutions, and end up feeling that these institutions are in some way "unresponsive" and "irrelevant" to their basic needs. And not only "unresponsive" and "irrelevant," but actually

"repressive" as well. It is a historical fact of some significance, I would say, that though schools were never particularly popular institutions among young people, it is only in recent years, as our schools have ceased trying to "form" young people and have tried instead to "develop" them, that the school has come to be widely regarded as a kind of prison.

The Legitimacy of Institutions

What we are talking about is the *legitimacy* of institutions, and what I am suggesting is that the moral neutrality of our institutions, especially our educational institutions, ends up robbing them of their popular legitimacy. Nor does it matter if this moral neutrality is, at the moment, popularly approved of and sanctioned by public opinion. It *still* ends up depriving these institutions of their legitimacy. One does not, after all, have to be a particularly keen student of history or psychology to know that people will accept or tolerate or even praise institutions which, suddenly, will be experienced as intolerable and unworthy. Institutions, like worm-eaten trees, can look healthy and imposing, until they crumble overnight into the dust. If you look at the *cahiers* submitted to the French Assembly on the eve of the great revolution, you will find not a breath of dissatisfaction with the monarchy—not a hint of republican aspirations. Similarly, early in 1964, an opinion poll among students at the University of California at Berkeley found that the overwhelming majority thought very well of the school and believed they were getting an excellent education there. Nevertheless, both Louis XVI and Clark Kerr soon found themselves riding the whirlwind. Such abrupt eruptions of profound discontent, catching us all by surprise—whether we are talking about the rebelliousness of racial minorities, or young people, or women, or whomever—are characteristic of American society today. They are also characteristic of a society whose institutions—whether they be political institutions, or schools, or the family—are being drained of their legitimacy—that is to say, of their moral acceptance.

We try to cope with this problem by incessantly "restructuring" our institutions so as to make them more "responsive" to popular agitation. But that obviously does not work very well. The more we fiddle around with our schools, for instance, the more energetically we restructure and then re-restructure them according to the passing fancy of intellectual fashion, the more steadily do they lose their good repute. In desperation, many of our reformers are falling back on the proposition that such

symptoms of discontent are really signs of good health and vigor—that it is *natural* for people to become more dissatisfied as things get better, and as they learn to appreciate the possibilities of even further improvement. Of all the absurdities of contemporary political sociology, this must rank as the most bizarre. It amounts to saying that, as the people's condition improves, they are bound to feel worse rather than better—more unhappy rather than more content. But surely the purpose of improvement is to make men and women feel more satisfied, not more dissatisfied—otherwise, in what sense can we talk of "improvement" at all?

It is a peculiarly perverse and morose view of human nature which claims that men's inevitable response to good actions is to feel bad. It is a view of human nature which, though desperately proposed by liberal humanism to explain the peculiar behavior of its believers, makes nonsense of the creed of liberal humanism itself, which cannot possibly subsist on the premise that the perfect human condition is one in which men are better off than ever before but feel miserable as never before. The unthinking way in which we nevertheless echo the thought that lively dissatisfaction is a form of "creativity," and that the generation of such "creativity" is a token of reformist success rather than a sign of reformist failure—this is a declaration of intellectual bankruptcy, and nothing else. It is nothing more than a way in which reformers secure an ideological credit card, good in perpetuity, which they can then indefinitely bank on regardless of their cash condition.

The irony of our present situation, as I see it, is that, as our institutions try to become ever more "responsive" to their constituencies, the people seem to put less and less faith in them generally. One can only conclude that either there is something wrong with the idea of "responsiveness" as we currently understand it, or that there is some fault in our idea of "the people" as we currently understand it. I should like to suggest that there is something wrong with both of these ideas, as we currently understand them—and that, ultimately, we are talking about a single error rather than a dual one: an error in the way we conceive the relations between a people and their institutions in a democratic society.

Strategies of Responsiveness

There is an old Groucho Marx chestnut about how he resigned from a club immediately upon being elected to membership—his resignation being prompted by the thought that any club which would elect him a member

couldn't possibly be worth joining. I think that, in this old chestnut, there is a lesson for all of us about "responsiveness." More and more of our institutions have been "reaching out" for "greater participation" and "greater involvement"—and an ever-larger number of those new recruits to full membership in the club have been quietly resigning, in fact if not in formality. To which our clubs seem to answer: "That's alright. Resigning is a way of belonging, and maybe the best club is one consisting of members who have resigned." This is the conclusion, at any rate, the Boy Scouts seem to have reached.

It is not easy to say to what degree our various strategies of "responsiveness" are motivated by sly cunning or plain self-deception. Thus, in the heyday of campus protest over the Vietnam war, and amidst an upsurge of political radicalism in general among college students, Congress decided to lower the voting age to 18. Now, to the best of my knowledge, there was not a single protest meeting on any American campus on the issue of a lower voting age. Similarly, to the best of my knowledge, Congress did not receive a single mass petition from young people on this matter. Nevertheless, Congress decided that, in the face of all this unrest, it couldn't simply remain mute and impassive. So it decided to be "responsive" in its way. It didn't end the Vietnam war, and it didn't abolish capitalism, but instead passed a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age to 18. That amendment was promptly ratified by the requisite number of state legislators, and shortly thereafter Richard Nixon was elected President by an overwhelming majority of the popular vote, and unrest on the campus was replaced by apathy. One cannot say Congress intended things to work out this way—most of the liberals who were the ardent proponents of a lower voting age certainly did not. But, in retrospect, there is reason to concede some substance to the lament of student radicals that a sort of con game had been practiced upon them.

So, one of the ways in which we are characteristically "responsive" is to give dissatisfied people what they have not asked for and what there was never any sound reason for believing they really wanted. Thus, when nonwhites in the ghettos of New York City began to express dissatisfaction with the fact that their children were being graduated from high school without even being able to read or reckon at an elementary school level, they were promptly given "community control" over their local school boards and "open admissions" to the senior city colleges. But if you look back at the course of events, you will discover that there never was any real popular demand for either "community control" or "open admissions." Neither of them had any bearing on the problems at hand. As a

matter of fact, any authentic conception of "community control" stands in rank contradiction to the practice of busing students for purposes of integration, which is also under way in New York's schools. What is the point of giving citizens "control" over their local schools when their children are being bused away to be taught in other schools? And, as concerns "open admissions," what is the point of admitting into college high school graduates whose problem is that they cannot read at an eighth-grade level? How does that solve the problem?

But we are also "responsive" in another, seemingly more candid but actually even more cunning, way. This is to give people what they are actually demanding—or at least what some are vociferously demanding—in the tranquil knowledge that these demands are misconceived anyway, and that their satisfaction is a meaningless gesture. That is what has happened with regard to parietal rules, course gradings, class attendance, curriculum requirements, nominal student representation on various committees, and so forth, on so many of our college campuses, and even in our lower schools as well. The strategy here may be defined as follows: When confronted with protest, dissatisfaction, and tumult, disburden yourself of your responsibilities but keep all your privileges, and then announce that your institutions have enlarged the scope of "participation" and "freedom" for all constituents. Since "participation" and "freedom" are known to be good democratic things, you have the appearance of rectitude and the reality of survival.

This complicated game of "responsiveness" has been skillfully played these past years and has enabled a great many institutions to maintain and secure their imperiled positions. In that sense, it has been unquestionably successful. In a deeper sense, however, it has gained nothing but time—a precious enough gain, but only if one realizes that it is simply time that has been gained, and that this time must be used productively if the gain is to be substantial rather than illusory. It is not my impression that any such realization exists, or even that people in authority are reflecting seriously on the events of the past decade. The question of the diminished legitimacy of our institutions is not being confronted—in the hope, no doubt, that it has gone away of its own accord. But I do believe it a serious error to think it has gone away, despite the sullen calm which now pervades our society. It seems to me, rather, that more and more people are showing more and more contempt for that club—the club which consists of the collectivity of our institutions—to which they have been elected. They may have ceased to abuse the facilities so excessively, but they are certainly not using them productively, nor do they show the slightest

inclination to pay their dues. As a matter of fact, their attachment is so obviously fragile that no one has asked them to pay any dues.

But who wants to belong to a club where you don't have to pay dues of any kind? What kind of a club is that?

The Importance of Obligations

It has been argued, by political philosophers and educators through the ages, that it is unwise to give people rights without at the same time imposing on them obligations—that rights without obligations make for irresponsibility, just as obligations without rights make for servility. Edmund Burke pushed this thesis a little further when he declared that it was part of the people's rights to *have* obligations—that an absence of obligation means a diminution of humanity, because it signifies a condition of permanent immaturity. But I would say we can extend this line of thought even further, and declare with some confidence, based on our own more recent experience, that obligation is not only a right but a *need*—people upon whom no obligations are imposed will experience an acute sense of deprivation. It is our striking failure to recognize this phenomenon of *moral deprivation* for what it is which explains our fumbling and even cynical response to the dissatisfaction that Americans are expressing toward their institutions.

I would claim that the main point which emerges from the American experience of late is that people do not have confidence in themselves—that people do not have respect for institutions which, instead of making demands upon the people, are completely subservient to their whims. One can even make the point more generally: Just as people will have no sense of prideful belonging to a society that has so low an opinion of them that it thinks it absurd to insist that people become better than they are, so they will feel equally alienated from a society that proclaims so high an opinion of them that it finds it absurd to insist that they need to become better than they are.

Institutions that *pander* to citizens—and I use that word "pander" advisedly—institutions which pander to the citizen in an effort to achieve popularity may get a good press for a while. Our mass media, for which pandering is an economic necessity, are naturally keen to see other institutions remake themselves in the media's own image—to become "responsive" the way a television station or network is responsive. "Responsiveness," here, means to satisfy popular appetite or desire or

whim or fancy—or, rather, to satisfy what is thought at any moment to be popular appetite or desire or whim or fancy. Such "responsiveness," being timely and circumstantial, is thought also to be "relevant." But amidst the noise of mutual self-congratulation, what is lost sight of is the fact that these institutions, floating on clouds of approval and self-approval, have uprooted themselves from that solid ground of moral legitimacy from which all institutions receive their long-term nourishment.

Do I exaggerate? Well, let me be specific about the problems of ghetto education—problems which I know you are all seriously concerned with, if not directly involved with. We have had, during the past decade, dozens of bold innovations in the schooling of slum kids, each of them claiming to be more "responsive" and more "relevant" than the previous ones. Some of these innovations have even rediscovered forms of classroom organization and techniques of pedagogy that were popular a hundred years ago—and you can't be more innovative than that! Each innovation, at some moment, is held up to us as a "breakthrough," is the subject of enthusiastic magazine articles and television reports—on the order of the *Times* report on Camp Keowa—is quickly imitated by enterprising school administrators elsewhere, and is generally judged to be a success before any results are in. Then it quietly vanishes, and nothing more is heard about it as attention focuses on some still newer innovation, by some other bold educational reformer who has "broken through" encrusted tradition and has come up with an even more "responsive" and "relevant" program. In general, the criteria of "relevance" and "responsiveness" is the degree to which the new educational scheme panders to the appetites, the fancies, the whims of the students, and avoids anything that looks like an exercise of authority.

Meanwhile, back in the ghetto, there continues to exist a whole set of successful schools which no one pays any attention to. These schools are successful in the most elementary yet crucial terms: There is a long list of parents trying desperately to register their children in these schools, the truancy rate and transfer rate are low, there is less juvenile delinquency, a lower rate of drug addiction among all students, and academic achievement levels tend to be slightly higher than average. I am referring, of course, to the parochial schools in the ghetto, which no one writes about, which the media ignore, but which—in the opinion of parents and students alike—are the most desirable of all ghetto schools. Many of these parochial schools are in old buildings with minimal facilities—a pitiful library perhaps, a squalid gymnasium perhaps, a spartan lunchroom perhaps. Anyone who had ever taken the trouble to open his or her eyes to the

existence of these schools would not have been astonished and taken aback—as so many were—by the findings of the Coleman report that the condition or even nonexistence of such physical facilities had little connection with educational achievement.

Why are the parochial schools in the ghetto so well regarded? The answer is obvious: They are *self-respecting* institutions, demanding institutions, with standards that students are expected to meet. Many of them even have and enforce dress codes, as a symbolic gesture of self-affirmation. By making such demands upon their students, they cause their students to make demands upon themselves—and, most important, cause their students to realize that the only true moral and intellectual "development" occurs when you do make demands upon yourself. And this—the habit of making demands upon ourselves—is something that we learn from being taught it by precept and example.

The Case for Authority

I suppose what I am saying can be and will be interpreted as just another critique of what we call "permissiveness." I should be unhappy if this happens because I so intensely dislike both that term and its associations. People who indiscriminately attack "permissiveness" are themselves victims of a confusion between authority and authoritarianism—a confusion they share with the very tendencies they criticize. "Permissiveness" and "authoritarianism" are indeed two possible poles of moral discourse—they are, both of them, the poles that come into existence when the center no longer holds. That center is *authority*, by which one means the exercise of power toward some morally affirmed end and in such a reasonable way as to secure popular acceptance and sanction. Legitimate authority is not always reasonable, since this authority is exercised by people who are not, in the nature of things, always reasonable. No one is always reasonable, and legitimate authority is therefore always open to criticism and correction. But if authority may be flawed in its means of operation, both "permissiveness" and "authoritarianism" are flawed in their goals, which are morally void and substanceless. This second flaw, clearly, is infinitely more important than the first, since it induces a kind of technocratic mania, with exponents of "permissiveness" figuring out ever new ways of "liberating" the citizen, but having no idea as to what he is being liberated for, while exponents of "authoritarianism" are busy figuring out how to control people for the sole purpose of securing the power of

existing institutions, with no serious conception as to the ultimate purpose of this power.

The "permissive" person is all for change, especially "social change;" the "authoritarian" person is all for "stability," especially "social stability." But there is something inherently ridiculous in being *for* change without having a clear and vivid perception of the kind of person and the kind of political community you want such change to eventuate in. Besides, if there is one thing certain in this world, it is change, which is but a descriptive term for the natural processes of birth, growth, decline, and death. The political problem is neither producing change nor suppressing it, but coping with it—adapting to it in the least costly and most beneficial way.

Similarly, the "authoritarian" person is all for stability. But stability is, in its own way, as inevitable as change. When we say stability, we mean a condition in which the arrangements of our lives, individual and collective, acquire a meaning and a value—it represents a victory over the continual flux of things, a temporary mastery over chance and destiny. The human race needs such meanings, both individual and collective, if it is to claim entitlement to the term "human." A meaningless life and a meaningless polity are insupportable and intolerable. So there is little point in singing the praise of stability *per se*. Just as one wants to know the answer to the question "Change for what?", so one wants to know the answer to the question "Stability for what?"

And the answers to these questions are provided by authority, properly understood. I am not talking about *power*, which is the capacity to coerce. I am talking about *authority*, in which power is not experienced as coercive because it is infused, however dimly, with a moral intention which corresponds to the moral sentiments and moral ideals of those who are subject to this power. Education, in its only significant sense, is such an exercise in legitimate authority. And when educators say that they don't *know* what their moral intention is, that they don't *know* what kinds of human beings they are trying to create, they have surrendered all claim to legitimate authority.

At that point, it really doesn't much matter whether they resort to an "authoritarian" mode of governance, with a blind and wilful reliance on tradition, or on a "permissive" mode of governance, which encourages blind and aimless "development." I must say, for my own part, that had I to choose between these two modes, I would opt for the "authoritarian" in the hope that a mechanical repetition of the forms just might reawaken and neutralize the dead substance that used to give these forms meaning and legitimacy. But this would be an extreme and desperate condition, and

just as extreme cases make for bad law, extreme conditions make for bad educational philosophy, and it is the better part of wisdom not to linger too long over them. What so many of us fail to see, however, is that the prevailing "permissiveness" is also an exercise in desperation, which is bound to be self-defeating. "Moral development," as now conceived, creates moral deprivation—a hunger of the soul for moral meanings—which is far more devastating and dangerous than any physical hunger. And this hunger of the soul will, in the end, satisfy itself by gratefully submitting to any passing pseudoauthority, which will be coercive in the extreme—and will be accepted *because* it is so coercive, because it does offer an escape from a dreadful, meaningless freedom. Those kids at Camp Keowa, dressed like slobs and sitting amidst their garbage and playing poker—they will, in all likelihood, end up by enthusiastically joining some movement which puts them in uniform, gives them songs to chant in unison, and sets them to work cleaning up every speck of dirt, under threat of the severest penalties. Having liberated them from the traditional authority of the Boy Scouts, we shall certainly end up delivering them to some newer, more rigid, and more brutal authoritarianism.

I can already hear the plaintive rejoinder: But where on earth, in this bewildered age, are our educators going to discover this moral authority without which authentic education is impossible? Who is going to give us the answers to questions about the meaning of our individual and collective lives? I recognize both the cogency and poignancy of this lament: Ours is indeed a bewildered age. But I would, at the risk of offending many of you, say this: If you have no sense of moral authority, if you have no sovereign ideas about moral purpose, you ought not to be educators. There are many technocratic professions, in which for all practical purposes the knowledge of means suffices—but education is not one of them. An educator who cannot give at least a tentative and minimally coherent reply to the question "Education for what?" is comparable to a clergyman who cannot explain the purpose of religion. We have many such clergymen. They, too, talk about "moral and ethical development." They, too, wonder why so many young people seem bored with the institutions their parents enlist them in. And they, too, in desperation drop anything old in favor of anything new. Having lost sight of their goals, they become the captives of intellectual and ideological fashion.

Is it so different with our educators? I fear not, though I should like to think otherwise. And I'll begin to think otherwise when, at a conference such as this, I see listed on the agenda a session on "Educational Chic." That is an event I most sincerely look forward to.

Higher Education and Moral Development

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Not "Whether," but "How?"

I take my subject to be not *whether* the experience of higher education contributes to the moral development of those who are exposed to it, but, rather, what forms that development may take, and through what mechanisms and processes it occurs. The question of whether higher education has an influence on the moral development of students is a special case of the broader question of what impact, if any, colleges have of any kind on the people who pass through them. Currently, there is a fashionable, widely held position which asserts—"argues" is too strong a word—that higher education does not have much effect of any kind. For example, a recent issue of *Psychology Today* (7) advertises an interview with Theodore Newcomb on its front cover with the title "Why College Does Not Change Students." In the table of contents the same interview is given a slightly different title: "What Does College Do For A Person? Frankly, Very Little." On the first page of the interview itself, however, when asked "What *does* college do for a person?" Newcomb answers "Frankly, very little *that is demonstrable*" (emphasis added). And by the second page, Newcomb is saying "I don't want to paint too black a picture. Certainly some students get interested in ideas, learn how to read, learn how to use libraries, learn to think in ways they simply would not do in another setting. Unfortunately, I don't think these benefits happen often enough."

We are now a long way from the front cover, and have arrived at a statement that most of us can agree with. The experience of higher education can and does have powerful effects on some students—I might have added other effects to Newcomb's short list. But since neither Theodore

Newcomb nor I, nor anyone else, knows how often it happens, or how deep and widespread these effects are on how students think and feel, it is not difficult for us to agree that "it doesn't happen often enough."

There really is no doubt that the experience of higher education has effects on students, both in their attitudes and behaviors. Newcomb and Feldman (2) have summarized much of the evidence on this for us, and more evidence has appeared since their book was published.* It is true that most of the indicators of change in our research on the effects of higher education leave us dissatisfied: They are not adequate measures of things we are really interested in, such as the growth and refinement of a student's sensibilities, the development of independence of mind, personal integrity, and moral autonomy. We know that these qualities are extremely difficult to study systematically: We don't know how to measure them; their appearance in action is often delayed until long after the college years; they are the product of a person's whole life experience, so that it is difficult to disentangle the independent effects of the college experience on them. Nevertheless, to infer from the difficulty of measurement that these effects don't occur—"What does college do for a person? Not much"—is to make the most serious error to which we members of the research community are prone, the error of believing that if a phenomenon can't be measured, it doesn't exist. This error is made by quantitatively inclined researchers in all of the social sciences. For example, Robert Hartman (4, p. 278), an economist, has observed that:

> Very little empirical evidence exists on external benefits. Economists who analyze public policy toward higher education have shown an increasing tendency to regard the absence of good, hard quantified data in this area as indirect evidence that no such benefits exist. This may be more a reflection of the deficiencies in the economists' education or the narrowness of their perspective: some things in this world cannot be quantified.

I am not prepared to accept that it is impossible, but I would agree that we face the greatest difficulties in measuring with any precision the amount or distribution of moral growth in our colleges and universities. And yet we persist, and I think rightly, in believing that moral growth does occur to some unknown degree and extent among our students. If that is true, and if we continue to think the matter important enough to want to know more about it, then we might shift our attention from the measure-

*See also B.R. Clark, *et al, Students and Colleges: Interaction and Change*, Berkeley, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1972.

ment of effects or outcomes to a consideration of the processes of education, and especially to the mechanisms through which colleges and universities have whatever effect they have on the moral life of their students. I am saying simply that we may be able to illuminate the ways in which things happen without knowing a great deal about how much or how often they happen.

On the Mechanisms of Moral Development

From that perspective, then, I would like to suggest a number of such mechanisms. These notes should be seen not as warranted assertions but rather as suggestions for the directions of research. With that understanding, I will allow myself to speak with more assurance than I feel about how these matters work.

Colleges and universities may influence the moral development of students in a variety of ways, both intended and unintended.

1. There is the influence of the content of the curriculum—that is, what we teach in our formal course offerings;

2. There is the influence of how we teach—and especially of the conceptions we present or demonstrate of how we extend our understanding of our subjects, of how we go about learning what we know;

3. There is the influence of the teacher as a person, both through his personal relationships with students and in his role as a model of the seeker of knowledge, for understanding, and for the truth (with a small "t").

There are at least two other important forces through which colleges and universities shape the minds, sensibilities, and moral capacities of students. One is through the relations of students with one another—the influence, as we say, of the peer group or of especially significant members of it. The second is the influence of the institutions as political entities in the broadest sense: the consequences for students of how the college or university orders the relations among its members, of how it governs its own activities and its relations with its environment. A good deal has been written on both these subjects in recent years, though still, I believe, without drawing the full implications of their findings for the moral development of students. Nevertheless, after acknowledging the importance of those influences, I would like to confine my brief remarks to the first three that I mentioned: the content and the forms of instruction and

the role of the teacher. And even within these rubrics I will be both sketchy and selective.

The Moral Impact of the Content of Instruction

The links between knowledge and moral action are very many and take many forms. But they have in common that morality evidences itself in choice and action. Where action is narrowly determined by power or necessity, where the range of personal decision hardly exists, then there is little room for the exercise of moral choice. (And in this grim century, writers like Camus have been led to reflect deeply on suicide as the ultimate affirmation of moral freedom, the exercise of moral choice under the most constrained circumstances.) But ignorance is also a constraint on choice: Decisions require a knowledge of alternatives, and a moral decision requires a knowledge of the probable consequences of those alternatives. Much of what we teach in our colleges and universities has as its aim the extension of our students' awareness of the possibilities of alternative courses of action and a clarification of their consequences. In the social sciences, this is very clear. There are, for example, few issues more important to mankind than the questions surrounding population growth. We face these issues both in our own private lives and, as citizens and political actors, in the realm of population policy. When an Indian farmer has ten children in the hopes of two sons surviving to support him in his old age, we cannot really speak of a moral choice. But for ourselves and our students, matters are otherwise. And demographers, sociologists, economists, and others can help us see the movements of population growth, the conditions under which these trends can be influenced, and the probable consequences, for individuals and for societies, of different ways of controlling the rate of growth of populations. Moral decisions do not end there, but this kind of knowledge about our alternatives and the consequences of our choices, so far as we can see them, is a prerequisite for the exercise of moral judgment in this area. And insofar as teachers discuss these issues and try, in Max Weber's words, to "make more transparent" the connections between cause and effect, then they teach in the service of the ethic of responsibility and the moral life.

The study of literature contributes to moral growth in other and not less important ways. I would not argue that literature justifies itself by its capacity to teach—and it is perhaps least successful when it aims most directly at didactic instruction. Yet literature, and I am thinking especially

of the novel, *does* teach. At its best it breaks through the crusts of conventional and routine ways of seeing and feeling, and helps us to see in fresh and new ways how life is lived and can be lived. When we see the world through Jane Austen's amused and penetrating eye, we learn to recognize insensitivity under the mask of manners; we learn that vulgarity is not merely a demonstration of consistent bad taste, but has a moral dimension and moral consequences. And we learn, with the help of Lionel Trilling (8), to understand Jane Austen's commitment to the ideal of "intelligent love" according to which, in Trilling's words, "the deepest and truest relationship that can exist between human beings is pedagogic. This relationship consists in the giving and receiving of knowledge about right conduct, in the formation of one person's character by another, the acceptance of another's guidance in one's growth." That concept of the relation between love and learning should have a special significance for us as teachers and students (though it speaks also to the changing relations between men and women in the society at large).

Of course, literature still has a life outside colleges and universities. But I think it is simply true that most people who read literature in ways that bear on their moral lives learn to do so in college, and do so with the help of teachers—not all of whom need to be Lionel Trilling to be helpful. We can see in our own lives, in the lives of our children and our friends, and perhaps even in the lives of our students, how the study of literature can influence one's capacities to make moral judgments and decisions, even though we cannot meet Newcomb's severe requirement that we know also how to demonstrate such effects.

But what we teach is not all in the service of moral growth. What we teach may limit as well as expand, confuse as well as clarify, moral choice. In a recent essay on "The Moral Crisis of the Black American" (5), Orlando Patterson, a black sociologist at Harvard, argues bitterly against the moral inadequacy of social science, which, in his view, by its well-intentioned reliance on one or another form of social determinism as the explanation of behavior, robs blacks of the full human stature and dignity that must rest on an acceptance of their moral autonomy. Patterson observes that "the unusually high crime rate among black adults, the high rate of juvenile delinquency, the high rate of marital instability and parental irresponsibility and the unusually high rate of dependence on welfare among the group are explained with almost ridiculous ease by social determinism. Any budding, first-year undergraduate in the social sciences could give a hundred and one reasons why these rates should not only in all probability be as they are, but, by all the laws of the social

universe, had to be as they are. But," he continues, "to constantly explain away one's failures as a product of one's environment, or worse, of another race's or class' doing, either directly or through the system it controls, is to reduce oneself to the level of an object and further prolong one's dependency on that other group or environment." Patterson describes other ways in which the dominant moral posture of the social sciences towards race—and I might suggest towards inequalities of almost all kinds—has a morally destructive effect on the group whose relative failures are being explained. I suggested earlier that social science contributes to moral development by extending our awareness of the alternatives of action, and the consequences of those alternatives. Here Patterson points to a way in which social science works implicitly to deny the possibility of a choice among alternatives for certain groups, thereby diminishing their moral autonomy and freedom.

One might also add a word about the moral failings (one might say bankruptcy) of the modern college curriculum, marked in many places by the collapse of all shared notions of what knowledge is of most worth. This, in turn, reflects a confusion and lack of agreement about the nature of a liberal education or the right relation of teachers and students. What may be clarified in a course is confused in the curriculum. There are many lessons to be learned from the anarchy of the college curriculum, and among these is the fear and abdication of authority and of its concomitant, responsibility. I suspect students learn that lesson too.

The Moral Impact of the Methods of Inquiry

We have a moral impact not only through what we teach, the content of our subjects and disciplines, but also through our ability to show how we come to know or believe what we do. There is a powerful morality implicit in the canons of verification, in our scholarly and scientific methods and procedures. This is perhaps most clear in our commitment to the search for negative evidence. For Max Weber (3, p. 147), this is the central moral role of education. In his great essay on "Science as Vocation," he asserts that

> The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize "inconvenient" facts—I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intel-

lectual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. I would be so immodest as even to apply the expression "moral achievement," though perhaps this may sound too grandiose for something that should go without saying.

The academic disciplines embody, in their methods of work, procedures designed to force their practitioners to confront inconvenient facts. For example, a major function of quantification in the social sciences is that it embodies impersonal procedures that ensure the collection of negative as well as supporting evidence for whatever "party opinion" we hold at the moment.

How does one deal with negative evidence? We can manage easily enough not to gather it; if we gather it, we can ignore it; or we can report it reluctantly and explain it away. Or we can actively search it out and make it central to our studies as a major vehicle for gaining more knowledge and a fuller understanding of what it is we are concerned with. The search for negative evidence and the decision to confront it and its implications for our current views are, I think, moral acts. And if we can teach our students to examine their views in the light of evidence, and to seek out inconvenient facts and opposing opinions, we have contributed to the development of their moral capacities as well as our own. Because these are virtues not merely of the scholar or scientist: A respect for evidence and for contrary opinion are qualities of mind that we need throughout the society, as we resist the terrible certainties and brutal simplifications of the fanatic, the doctrinaire, the bigot, and the demagogue.

But while an acquired respect for negative evidence has a special role in the moral impact of the academic disciplines, it is by no means the only way in which learning is implicated with values. More generally, science and scholarship are "moral communities" whose members must create and sustain a distinctive set of values in order to carry on their work. As Bronowski (1, pp. 391-392) notes:

> The very activity of trying to refine and enhance knowledge—of discovering "what is" imposes on us certain norms of conduct. The prime condition for its success is a scrupulous rectitude of behavior, based on a set of values like truth, dignity, dissent, and so on . . . . In societies where these values did not exist, science has had to create them, to make the practice of science possible.*

*On the difficult questions of what the norms of science are, the degree to which they guide behavior, and how they are enforced, see, for example, R.K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973, and especially his essay on "The Normative Structure of Science."

To what extent are students drawn into the "moral communities" of science and scholarship, to what extent do they acquire their norms and values as well as their knowledge and perspectives? That is, of course, highly variable. It has, traditionally, been a central concern of graduate education—and if graduate students in a department are not, for some reason, being "socialized" into that moral community effectively—if, for example, they pursue graduate studies as a continuation of their liberal education, or use it for political or other ends of their own without accepting the special research norms of science and scholarship—then the department, and perhaps the discipline, are in some difficulties. The acquisition of these scholarly and scientific norms—in other words, the values of the discipline as a research enterprise—has not been stressed for undergraduates; it has been seen often as a symptom of premature professionalization or specialization. But increasingly, colleges and universities are beginning to offer freshman research seminars to introduce beginning students to the discipline as a community of seekers for knowledge. And that, inevitably, must bring them at least to the borders of the discipline as a moral community. How successfully that is accomplished with undergraduates is, as I have said, variable and uncertain. But the success of those efforts might well be an additional criterion of the impact of college on students—and we should be able to find ways to assess it.*

On the Moral Implications of Academic Programs and Policies

What I've been saying about the moral dimensions of scholarly and scientific work may also have implications for the value of the academic disciplines and specialties as compared with interdisciplinary studies. It is perfectly clear that social problems do not present themselves in the convenient categories of the academic disciplines, and that many of the

*We should also ask whether early introduction to the norms and values of research in a discipline need be at the expense of a "liberal education"—a broad exposure to a variety of ways of looking at the worlds of man and nature, each with its own, somewhat different, moral lessons to teach. In the design of an undergraduate education, there are certain conflicts between the moral community of inquiry and the moral content of the major fields of learning—between, for example, what anthropology can teach about the human condition as over against how it goes about finding things out. Departments typically try to teach a little of both, the latter often under the rubric "methods." But while "methods" courses may tell students that there is a moral community of inquiry, it is likely that only the experience of seeking knowledge themselves through the discipline's own methods of inquiry will effectively bring students inside it.

most important questions about man and society also transcend the disciplinary boundaries. And a natural response to this is to argue against the department as the unit of organization of undergraduate education, and to make attempts to organize interdisciplinary studies, especially in the social sciences, that are more appropriate in their range of perspectives and intellectual resources to the questions that students and society ask of them. I have made this argument myself from time to time in my own university. But there may be a price that we pay for interdisciplinary studies, to the extent that we substitute a richer but less systematic discussion of issues for a narrower but more systematic one. I mean by "systematic" here the impersonal pressures that a discipline exerts on those who work within its boundaries, pressures to formulate problems in ways that can be addressed by evidence. Disciplines embody a variety of controls over the influence of personal bias, and not least among these are the procedures that force the confrontation with negative evidence. Interdisciplinary studies may bring a rich variety of perspectives to bear on an issue, but my impression is that when difficult problems arise, the tendency of interdisciplinary courses is to look at the matter from yet another perspective rather than confront the difficulty head-on. There is also at work the well-known but little documented phenomenon of "disciplinary courtesy": We are not inclined to challenge the professional judgment or competence of colleagues in other disciplines. We are disinclined both by the norm of professional courtesy and by our own lack of specialized expertise in other fields to go behind the assertions of other disciplines to the structure of concepts and data on which they are, sometimes precariously, based.

I am not here making a general attack on interdisciplinary studies, of which I am a warm if somewhat qualified admirer. I want only to suggest that the price we pay for their breadth of perspective may lie in the moral education of our students, at least that part of their moral education which arises out of a sense of the importance, indeed the value, of intellectual difficulties, and a personal commitment to confront them rather than evade them by dropping the question and shifting the perspective to another part of the intellectual forest. The policy implication may be that interdisciplinary studies are not inherently preferable to a program of coordinated studies within departments, but need to be examined in every case on their own merits. In addition, we might pay more attention to their methodology and try to find ways of requiring ourselves to confront unwarranted assumptions and inadequate theories, and to ask at strategic moments for the evidence behind assertions in other people's disciplines.

The concern for moral development has its implications for policy in higher education. I mentioned earlier that the teacher can function as a model of intellectual virtues insofar as he can bring a freshness of perspective and a steady seriousness to his materials in his classrooms and seminars. The enemy of this spirit is routine, and surrender to routine is a natural response to fatigue and overload. When a teacher is required to offer four different courses simultaneously, in addition to counseling, committee work, and perhaps some scholarly or scientific work of his own, there is little chance that he can bring a fresh perspective to a subject very often. The demands of the day require him to lean on old notes, on summaries of what he knows rather than the demonstration of discovery. I believe that very heavy teaching loads adversely affect the quality of teaching. But that is extremely hard to demonstrate, especially if the criterion of student performance is the acquisition of packets of knowledge rather than, for example, the capacity to make good and independent judgments about the quality of evidence, or the qualities of people.

But compared with the considerable effort to study the effectiveness of different modes of instruction where the criterion is the acquisition of knowledge or skills, we have very little research on the effect of different styles of teaching under varying conditions on the more subtle and elusive qualities of mind that many would agree are among the real aims of liberal education. We are also always taking easy-to-measure proxies for these more difficult-to-study effects—and the proxies may be poor indicators of what we are really concerned about. I do not think that we need be satisfied with speculative hunches and hypotheses about these matters: The quality of teaching, and its effects on the intellectual and moral development of our students, is a proper and appropriate subject for systematic study as well as for speculation and reflection.

On "Elitism"

I should perhaps at this point try to answer the charge of elitism even before it is raised. It is, we know, a very grave charge in a populist and egalitarian time. The charge ordinarily is that the kind of teaching and learning I am speaking about are idealized, or at least so rare in practice that they have little relevance to the mass education of eight million college and university students in nearly 3,000 institutions of every size, shape, and description. Moreover, the charge continues, a concern with

these rare and indeed rarified styles of teaching and learning can only be pursued at the expense of the great mass of teachers and students who have very different interests and worries. There are two answers to this charge that I can imagine. One is embodied in the reply that Robert Oppenheimer made when asked in a public meeting what he thought about the reforms then under way in science education in colleges and universities across the country. Was it his view, he was asked, that the training of the 10,000 or so physics majors around the country had been improved by these reforms? He paused for a moment and with a tiny smile replied, "I'm terribly sorry, but I haven't really thought about that. You see, I'm really only interested in about 10 of them." That kind of bold and uncompromising elitism may, in fact, be appropriate if your chief concern is the progress of a science. But we cannot be satisfied with the moral education of a tiny elite, not because Oppenheimer's attitude is unfashionable, as it is, but rather because the moral capacities we are talking about influence not the speed of scientific discovery but the quality of civilization, and we need those qualities as broadly distributed in our society as possible.

Mass higher education, if we mean by that the extension of access to ever-larger proportions of the American population, should not be made the grounds of an attack on education of the highest quality. What we mean by "highest quality" may well be debated, and I certainly do not equate it with the education provided at the most prestigious or most expensive colleges and universities. Nevertheless, I believe that the development of the capacities to make moral judgments is a characteristic of higher education as we would like it to be. There is no doubt that some of the characteristics of mass higher education, especially the impersonal processing of large numbers of students through institutions where they have little close or sustained relation to any teacher, do not aid the growth of their moral capacity. I believe that universal access to some form of postsecondary education is both inevitable and desirable; but that the education of very large numbers need not be through impersonal batch-processing techniques. Nor should we place our faith so heavily in technological solutions to intellectual and moral problems. For example, the provision of higher education through remote computer consoles and video tape television may have certain limitations if seen from the perspective we have been sketching. In any event, the charges of elitism are very often mere abuse in the service of an anti-intellectual leveling of institutions, part of a powerful movement that I believe is the enemy of the broad and diverse system of higher education that exists in this country. We should not be intimidated by it.

On the Moral Influence of the Teacher

I have suggested that a personal relationship between student and teacher increases the likelihood that the teacher can play a role in the moral education of the student. And that surely accords with traditional wisdom, with the findings of social science, and with our own experience. By and large, we are influenced, at least in our attitudes and values, more by people whom we care about personally and with whom we have a continuing personal relationship. But even here we must distinguish a teacher in his* role as model and in his role as "friend." Teachers may have significant influence on their students even when no very close personal relationship is present. Such teachers, seeming to embody the norms and values that they profess, bear witness in their own lives and work to the possibility of a life directed to the pursuit of truth.

My impression is that these exemplary models make their impact through certain unique qualities that they possess: Larger than life, they do not merely teach, but expand our notions of the possibilities of human life. There is the teacher who brings to his reading of literature a visible joy in the illumination of a text, for whom the discovery of its meaning is happening now, at this moment, in this classroom. There is the quite different style of the teacher who publicly submits his own thought to the most searching criticism, and who shows us, through a scrupulous attention to inconvenient facts, the difference between what is plausible and what is probable. If the first teacher shows us the joys of learning, the second shows us its pains and difficulties, and gives us in his work an operational definition of intellectual integrity. And there are other powerful styles of teaching: for example, the teacher who embodies the demands and prescriptions of a highly skilled art or craft.

What is common to these teachers who have an impact on the moral life of their students by serving as models of the intellectual virtues is that as teachers they resist successfully the powerful pulls of routine. Very much, perhaps most, teaching at any level is a fairly routine organization of information and skills packaged for delivery to students who do not yet have them. Only occasionally do most of us "come alive" in the classroom and present to our students not merely what our disciplines purport to know but how they actually work, and demonstrate with what qualities of spirit and feeling these hard-won insights and understandings have been gained. But teachers who serve as powerful models differ from the rest of

*Throughout, of course, "his" means "his or her."

us in the consistency with which they exhibit these qualities, the consistency with which they are genuinely alive in the classroom, actually experiencing, as if for the first time, the joys of discovery or the rigors of analysis. It is this extraordinary capacity to resist emotional, intellectual, and spiritual fatigue and the consequent resort to routine exposition, that marks this kind of teacher. Because what is so impressive to those fortunate enough to study with these teachers is precisely this consistency of live response to familiar material: It seems to demonstrate that their teaching reflects not what they are paid to do but what they are, and in that way, it expands our conception of the possibilities of human life. And that can still impress a generation that is not greatly impressed by what men know or do. Students who discount all "mere" accomplishment can still be moved by qualities of being.

I have suggested that among the mechanisms through which higher education influences moral development in students is first, what we teach; second, the norms and procedures of scholarly and scientific disciplines; and third, the influence of teachers as friends and models. But each of these is subject to its own misuse, its own distortions and pathologies, whereby it serves not the development but the constriction or deformation of the moral life. This is clear, for example, when we think of the teacher as friend or model.

"Personalism" and "Charisma"

Personal ties between teachers and students at least make more difficult the application of what sociologists call "universalistic" standards, the judgment of performance rather than of person. (Some may not think that such a bad thing: The commitment of higher education to the meritocratic principles of competitive excellence is under sharp attack right now.) But this problem may take the form that David Riesman and his colleagues have called "personalism." This is a pattern in which teachers develop very close ties with a small group of students who share their views about the world or a discipline (sometimes it is much the same thing) while largely ignoring the great majority of students who do not qualify as accolytes or apprentice true believers. In their study *Academic Values and Mass Education*(6), Riesman and his colleagues observed the way in which a group of social scientists in one institution created a tight in-group around such a special view of the world and also developed strong personal ties with a small group of students who, perhaps more royalist than the king (as is not

uncommon for new converts), came to regard the other faculty as "the enemy camp." This premature commitment to an orthodoxy, this kind of intellectual closure, surely cannot have been to the benefit either of their intellectual or moral development. In addition, the faculty members in this group began to judge students not primarily on what they had learned of their subjects, but on whether they had acquired the appropriate view of the world—whether, in short, they had been converted to the preferred intellectual or social style. And they rewarded students who had and punished those who had not. The dangers of teaching becoming indoctrination, and the substitution of new orthodoxies for old, is always present, especially in relatively invertebrate disciplines like the social sciences; the danger is greater when deep personal involvements increase the possibilities for these private conversions. And yet, having noted the danger, it is still true that personal ties, when not in the service of a doctrine, can be a powerful force in the moral development of students. There is a fine line between a student's fruitful commitment to a style of work and thought and his conversion to a constricting orthodoxy. And we need to find out more about the difference.

Similarly, the powerful teacher who serves as a model for his students can exploit that power to become a guru, a spiritual leader who has enormous attraction for the young because he short-circuits the difficult pursuit of truth by simply having it all himself. Max Weber (3, p. 149), in the essay from which I have already quoted, spoke passionately of the moral constraints on the teacher not to use his podium to preach a social or political doctrine, not to assume, in Weber's terms, the mantle of a leader of youth. But he knew also how many German youth of his day (as also some in America today) seek in college for some ultimate truth, some transcendent philosophy which will give meaning to life and the times. He has these students say to their teachers: "Yes, but we happen to come to lectures in order to experience something more than mere analyses and statements of fact." And to this he opposed his own stern and austere conception of the teacher's role. "The error," he replies, "is that they seek in the professor something different from what stands before them. They crave a leader and not a teacher. But we are placed upon the platform solely as teachers and these are two different things, as one can readily see."

I understand Weber here to mean not that the relation of teacher and student cannot also be one in which there is moral development, but rather that the moral development cannot, ought not, be the purpose of our teaching but rather a by-product of what and how we teach. We are not German professors of 1920, nor are we very often placed on plat-

forms. The distance, social and emotional, between us and our students is infinitely narrower than it was for Weber and his contemporaries. And that, I think, is all for the good. We see some of the severe and long-delayed reactions to the conditions described by Weber in the current turmoil and disarray of German universities. And yet, the yearning for new religions, both secular and sacred, with their promises of systems of ultimate truth in a confusing world, can still be seen in our classrooms. The opportunities for evangelical missionary work are there, especially in our ever more informal teaching arrangements, our perhaps overly personalized styles, our relentless attitudes of friendliness and often pseudo-intimacy. We find those opportunities, too, in the current attacks on the structures of thought and the norms of inquiry of the disciplines themselves. As we observe the fashionable pursuit of educational innovations, almost for their own sakes, innovations that are frequently accompanied by attacks on the "narrow, ossified, specialized disciplines," we might reflect on the extent to which the disciplines, by providing us with external criteria and the machinery for forcing us to confront negative evidence, serve the moral growth of students and teachers as much as they do the growth of knowledge. We all are, for the most part, extremely indulgent to our own pieties. We need the help both of critical colleagues who are competent in our fields and of impersonal rules of inquiry to prevent us from acquiring followers rather than teaching students. Whatever their shortcomings, most discipline-based departments supply both; some other ways of organizing instruction do not. That fact, and not necessarily "blind stubborness," may at least partly account for the survival of the academic department in the face of widespread criticism.

Conclusion: On Research and Policy

I said at the start that these observations were meant to suggest some directions for research. The design of such research should, of course, be determined by the nature of the problem and the resources available and not by any methodological doctrines. But while my own bias is that of someone who works chiefly through large-scale survey research, my guess is that many of the issues I have been discussing are not, in our present state of knowledge, most usefully studied through sample surveys. On the other hand, the anthropological research tradition of direct observation and qualitative interviewing is not strong in the community that does most of the research on higher education. There is, then, a gap between our

research traditions and training, and the kinds of problems I have been discussing. If we think those problems are important, we ought to try to close the gap.

Second, the questions surrounding the moral education of students in colleges and universities have clear implications for educational policies. Elsewhere I have distinguished between the public and the private lives of higher education (9)—the public life involving all the discussions and decisions about financing, organization, administration, and governance of institutions and systems; the private life of higher education comprising what actually goes on between and among students and teachers, the actual processes of teaching and learning. The moral development of students, insofar as it occurs, lies at the heart of the private life of higher education. But policies are made largely in the other sphere, and yet these policies shape the conditions under which teaching and learning go on. We need continually to remind ourselves and those who make these policies that ultimately the aim of the public life of higher education should be the health and vitality of its private life. When those who make policy lose sight of that connection, as they do, we must remind them of it, firmly and often. Better yet, we ought to pursue research which enables us to show them just what the connections are between the public and the private, between policy and learning. That may be the most important contribution the research community can make to the world of higher education which we both study and serve.

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Moral Development, Ethics, and the Professional Education of Lawyers

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The American public has historically been ambivalent about the lawyer: He has been simultaneously folk hero and folk villain. Even today against the joint negative backdrops of Watergate and *The Paper Chase*, that same ambivalence persists. I recently counted more favorable than unfavorable depictions of lawyers in television dramas, and the near-caricature of law professors in *The Paper Chase* has certainly not decreased or even stabilized the flow of applicants to law school.

But the concerns and dissatisfactions with the legal profession that inhere in my subject, moral development, ethics, and the professional education of lawyers, have deep roots and recurring manifestations. As I shall try to show, they are not very far along the road to satisfaction.

What is at issue is the set of relationships among the three variables set forth in the title: moral development, ethics, and the professional education of lawyers. How are lawyers formally trained to exercise professional responsibility as practitioners? Is there a basic ethic which underlies and determines the behavior of lawyers? How does that ethic, if any, comport with commonly accepted moral precepts?

And, to jump to my conclusion: The formal training of lawyers is not conducive to establishing a common ethos; in major respects such common ethos as does exist is either inconsistent with commonly accepted notions of fairness and justice or is ambiguous. Law students arrive at law school with established notions of morality; the law school is a peculiarly inhospitable place to inculcate moral standards; and the standards of the legal profession are themselves ambiguous about essential concepts.

Moral Development

Let me turn to the first of the three variables of my title: moral development. Without attempting a sophisticated definition, I mean by words like "moral" and "moral development" the set of basic values such as honesty, justice, fairness, and responsibility. What then is the relationship between the moral development of the future lawyer—the law student—at the time he or she enters law school and the shaping institutions, the school, and the legal profession?

In most of the United States, one cannot become a lawyer without having graduated from a law school approved by an official accrediting agency. Since World War II, a bachelor's degree has become a condition precedent for admission to most law schools. This requirement of a bachelor's degree for admission to law school has two highly significant consequences on the receptivity and adaptability of the student body to further moral development. For one, it assures that the law student is about 22 years old when he or she enters law school and between 25 and 26 upon admission to the bar. At those ages, how susceptible moral attitudes are to change—without traumatic intervention—is highly debatable.

The bachelor's degree requirement also assures that law students come from the sector of the population which graduates from college. Until the last five years, the actual law school population in the United States has consisted almost entirely of white males.

This profile of the law student population has undergone significant alteration during the past decade. The percentage of women has doubled and doubled again (in the case of our own law school, from a fairly constant 5 percent to this year's 30 percent of the entering class). Deliberate efforts to enroll minority students—principally black and chicano—have produced parallel increases for those populations.

This diversification of student populations may also have diversified the moral attitudes of the students depending upon whether such attitudes are correlated less with ethnicity and sex than with socioeconomic status, for class structure in the law school of today is probably not very different from what it has always been. So far as peer impact on values is concerned, the law student peer group does not appear to differ significantly from peer groups students belonged to before coming to law school.

What, then, of the professional education? To what extent can the educational institution affect its students in these matters? To what extent does it?

It is difficult to conceive of educational institutions that are structured more poorly to inculcate moral attitudes in their students than are university law schools, the primary schools for lawyers. Consider these aspects of legal education in the United States:

1. The faculty-student ratio--a heritage of the development of legal education in the large lecture hall--assures that the average class size is at least 70.

2. Until the most recent decade, legal education was almost entirely theoretical, analytical, or conceptual: There was little real-world experience and just slightly more simulation. The teaching methodology was didactic with the Socratic method its highest or lowest form, depending on which variation on that theme was played. To the extent that there was an "affective" component, its purposes and effect were to increase intellectual performance.

3. The orientation of most law faculty is that of skepticism; moreover, liberal ideology and notions of academic restraint tend to preclude deliberate efforts to affect the moral standards or values of the students.

4. The demands of universities for scholarly publication sharply curtail the involvement of the faculty in the practice of law. Further, although the divorcement of university law faculty from the practice is not quite total and is probably less today than a decade or two ago, in the main those who become law professors are exceptionally able law students who either decide that they do not want to practice law at all, or after several years of practice, decide to leave to become law professors, in many instances because they do not like what lawyers do.

Thus, although most are intensely interested in the theory and workings of the law, members of law faculties in the United States tend to have little interest in the moral, ethical, or professional problems of lawyers *qua* lawyers. Courses in law school on professional responsibility or ethics have invariably been at the low end of the curriculum status scale. Law school research on the problems of the legal profession has been scanty.

There are, however, signs of change in academe, although it is too soon to assess their performance. The first is the advent of clinical legal education in substantial measure within the past 10 years, so that law students now have an opportunity to experience in a structured environment the ways and woes of the lawyers. The second is the increased frequency with which young law faculty have become members of the bar of the states in

which they teach (a shift of professional pattern), making it possible for them to handle legal matters—usually of the indigent or "public interest" variety—in a professional way. Thus, there is a footing on which a small bridge to the practicing profession might be built.

But the short of it is that, as a result of history, structure, student characteristics, and faculty constituency, the university law school has been an inhospitable place for the inculcation of moral attitudes or even professional responsibility.

There is enough in the previous paragraphs, I think, to suggest that the university law school, the principal educational institution concerned with the training of lawyers, has done and probably can do little in the way of inculcating moral values. But if the concept of morals is expanded so as either to include what might more appropriately be called "professional socialization," or is viewed as interacting with standards of professional responsibility, the question changes to: How can or does the educational institution teach or inculcate these attributes of professionalism?

Until the Civil War, legal education was dominated by the apprenticeship system, with academic legal training being both voluntary and also playing for the most part a supplementary role. Subsequently, academic legal training provided an alternate route of admission to the bar; in a number of states, a combination of both formal academic training and apprenticeship was then required for admission.

Precepts of ethics and professional responsibility—in addition to skills training—were learned in this period through exposure to the supervising lawyer, the master of the master-apprentice relationship. The embryonic lawyer was socialized by observing and doing. Of course, this was an atomistic form of education, depending upon the individual lawyer who served as master. But external conditions were conducive to the application of common standards. There were relatively few lawyers; most had the same kinds of practices so that professional problems were similar. All—from pace setter to transgressor—were highly visible to the others. Peer pressure could be exercised effectively.

This is not to say that the public was satisfied with the standards or their exercise. Three times at least in our history—during the colonization period, immediately following the American Revolution, and during Jacksonian populism—there were concerted efforts to abolish the legal profession, movements which have their parallels in other nations. It is to say, however, that the apprenticeship system of the early period of the development of the American legal profession performed the function of inculcating professional standards.

But formal education ultimately supplanted the apprenticeship system; today it has preempted the field. Indeed, few states require any apprenticeship at all before certification for the practice.

This demise of the formal apprenticeship system has not, however, eliminated it. Although more than half the number of American lawyers still classify themselves as solo practitioners, by far the great majority of law graduates begin their careers as law employees—of judges, lawyers, corporations, governmental institutions. In those positions they presumably learn standards of professional responsibility. How well this is done and what is learned, of course, depend upon the employer. Moreover, the structure of today's bar is different from that of the earlier era. Lawyers now tend to specialize so that professional problems are not pervasively shared; in the metropolitan areas where the majority of lawyers practice, peer controls have diminished because of lack of repetitive contacts among lawyers and because of the low visibility of individual lawyers.

Thus, it is probable that socialization of the law student to the legal profession takes place primarily through the apprenticeship system and not under the aegis of the educational institution.

Notions of Professional Responsibility

Suppose, however, as is now being pressed upon American law schools by the principal accrediting agency, the American Bar Association, law schools seriously undertook to inculcate notions of professional responsibility to their students—to socialize them to that extent at least. Apart from pedagogical and methodological problems, what would be the central theme?

Let me propose three different possible standards describing the relationship of the lawyer's value structure to that of his client:

1. A lawyer should do everything for his client that is lawful and that the client would do for himself if he had the lawyer's skill;

2. A lawyer *need not* do for his client that which the lawyer thinks is unfair, unconscionable or over-reaching, even if lawful.

3. A lawyer *must not* do for his client that which the lawyer thinks is unfair, unconscionable or over-reaching, even if lawful.

It will be giving away no professional secrets to tell you that the first standard of behavior is the one that is largely applied in a contested

judicial matter; this I shall call the total client commitment model. The second standard of behavior is officially recognized as appropriate for non-litigated matters; this I shall call the individual preference model. The third standard is no part of official doctrine.

I should now like to discuss the implications of these models with respect to both the actual behavior of lawyers and the educational system. (I should emphasize that in discussing these models of lawyer behavior, I am not covering the totality of the rules of professional behavior or the entire reach of the codes. Many other aspects of the lawyer's professional responsibility are treated in these rules and codes, some of which may also present problems of the type I am here discussing. Indeed, there are established professional restraints even under the total client commitment model. My focus, however, is on what I consider to be a primary problem of professional behavior, and my remarks are limited to that problem.)

The first model derives from the adversary system—that Anglo-American form of dispute resolution in which an impartial tribunal presides over a contest in which the parties have the assigned roles of representing their own interests to the maximum. That system puts to the parties the functions of issue definition, of presenting evidence in their own behalf, and of challenging the evidence of the other party. There is no obligation to assist the other side; indeed, to do so would be a violation of the total client-commitment model, the obligations of the professional representative, the lawyer. To the complaint that the professional obligation should be more even-handed, the classic response is that of Samuel Johnson, as reported by Boswell (2):

> Sir, a lawyer has no business with the justice or injustice of the cause which he undertakes, unless his client asks his opinion, and then he is bound to give it honestly. The justice or injustice of the cause is to be decided by the judge. . . A lawyer is to do for his client all that his client might fairly do for himself, if he could. If, by a superiority of attention, of knowledge, of skill, and a better method of communication, he has the advantage of his adversary, it is an advantage to which he is entitled. . . .

Baron Bramwell (3) has another classical statement:

> A client is entitled to say to his counsel, "I want your advocacy, not your judgment; I prefer that of the Court!"

The lawyer thus has no difficulty with the question "How can you represent him when you know he's guilty?" For the law requires that the issue be contested and that the lawyer represent his client's position as

well as he can, whatever he may believe or know about the client's guilt. If the murderer walks home free because of his lawyer's skill, and not because he didn't do it, that is no more than the legal system demands.

The dilemma of ends and means is as acute here as anywhere. The thoughtful lawyer must keep telling himself that although the result in a particular case may seem unfair or unjust,—and I by no means intend to suggest that this is always a clear-cut determination—in the long run the system works the best results in the greatest number of cases. So stated, however, it seems clear that there appears to be a basic clash of values between the adversary system ethic and that of the ordinary person observing that process.

But the problem, even within the adversary system, is more complex. To take an archtype, it is received wisdom that in addition to his obligation to represent the "guilty," in the carrying out of that obligation the criminal defense lawyer must employ every lawful technique. Thus, he cross-examines to impeach opposition witnesses he knows to be telling the truth; he exploits evidence adduced by the other side which is in his client's favor, even though he personally believes or knows the evidence to be false or mistaken. That he may not suborn perjury or deliberately destroy relevant evidence is of course a measure of restraint on his total commitment to his client. But these other techniques surely seem out of line with traditional notions of fair play and just result.

To the extent that American legal education has been concerned with the ethic of the legal profession, the total client-commitment role of the lawyer in the adversary system has been its focus, a role which raises the fundamental clash of values to which I have previously referred. And that clash is dramatically and sharply perceived by law students.

Once again, however, the problems do not stop there. It is necessary to turn to those activities that take up by far the bulk of time of the lawyers of the United States, the non-litigating activities of negotiating, counseling, planning. What do the accepted standards say about these roles? How should the lawyer respond when his client wishes to take advantage of one with whom he deals, advantage the lawyer believes to be unfair in the circumstances but which the law allows? For example, what is the lawyer's responsibility when the client proposes that he draft the terms of an agreement the lawyer believes to be unfair to the other side, which may not be represented by a lawyer at all? What about the form lease for a low-income apartment house, drafted by a lawyer, which cleverly nullifies the tenant's rights? Or the lawyer who discovers an escape hatch in the most recent anti-pollution legislation which will enable his client to avoid

conforming and to continue polluting despite his own views on the undesirability of that outcome?

As I have already indicated, that part of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility which deals with this problem (the previous version scarcely dealt with it) is contained in the group of precepts known as Ethical Considerations. And these precepts give the lawyer the unequivocal instruction that his behavior is up to him. In the words of the relevant sections (1):

> . . . In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself. In the event that the client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment.
>
> In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an action in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action.

These precepts remit the decision on how to behave to the individual lawyer. No general institutional rule is to be observed except that it is up to the individual. This is the individual preference model. There is an apparent out, however. The lawyer need not continue his presentation. He may withdraw. But this proviso assumes that the client is free to seek another lawyer who exercises his individual preferences differently.

It is here that the other variables in my subject—moral development and professional education of lawyers—return for consideration. What is essentially at issue is how the lawyer's individual value structure—his morality—should relate to his client's desires, assuming as always that the desires are lawful. To recapitulate: The students arrive at law school with fairly well-established individual codes; the faculty has the limitations I have previously described; and there is no mandate from the profession to which one can turn for help—except, of course, the mandate of individual preference.

A Single Standard for Office and Courtroom

It is in these circumstances that another characteristic of the American legal profession appears: the lack of a formal separation between litigating

and nonlitigating lawyers here like the division between barrister and solicitor in England, a pattern which appears in other countries as well. In those environments, enforcement of different precepts of conduct is presumably simpler because different personnel perform different functions. But in this country, the absence of the separation means that the American lawyer embodies in himself, at least as a theoretical matter, all possible roles of the lawyer. For him to apply different standards of behavior as he moves from one role to another would be difficult at best. But the second standard leaves the question of participation in unfair transactions that are lawful and to his client's benefit to his own discretion. One can surely anticipate that the lawyer will rely upon the accepted standard of behavior that derives from the environment of the adversary system and do for his client that which is lawful even though unfair or unjust.

Thus, one senses—although there is little hard evidence—that the actual standard of representation does not differ between the courtroom and the office, despite the fact that the articulated standards could be applied differently.

What does all this imply for the professional education of lawyers? For the educational institution?

One could communicate these ideas to the law student and urge either the total client-commitment model or the individual preference model as the future lawyer's ethical standard. If the former, the moral value system of the student becomes irrelevant in determining his behavior. But there is reason to predict that the model will go down hard when it is applied outside the courtroom. For there seems to be something amiss when the accepted standard of behavior—the ethic of the profession—is one of lending professional assistance to over-reaching conduct.

The alternative—the individual preference model—presents the educational institution with two possibilities. The first is to expose in each troubled situation the relevant moral values that obtain and the variety of professional considerations that may also be relevant, calling upon the student to make his choice of behavior in a more self-perceiving way. Value clarification may have a place here. But it is not very clear how pedagogically sound this would be. If all answers to a problem are generally acceptable, how much insight can be added to their solution by this type of exposure?

The other possibility would be for the educational institution affirmatively to attempt to change the values or preferences of the students. That undertaking would not only require a radically different approach to legal

education from the current one, it also suggests that faculty should be appointed not only because of their traditional competences of scholarship and teaching, but also because they possess the "right" values to be transmitted to their students. One wonders about the dimensions of the struggles among unversity boards of trustees, administration, and faculty were this criterion for appointment to be accepted.

A different approach would be for the educational institutions through persuasion to effect a change in the professional ethic to the third model initially proposed: A lawyer *must not* assist his client in unfair, unconscionable or over-reaching conduct even though lawful. This, of course, raises the same pedagogical problems as the second one.

I suspect there is no significant consensus on these issues. Perhaps our views turn on the roles in which we see ourselves when we consider them. Do we see ourselves as clients, as men and women without lawyers dealing with others who are represented by lawyers, as lawyers themselves, or perhaps as uninvolved critics of the social scene?

Much, but certainly not all, of the historic and current hostility toward lawyers derives, I believe, from the clash of values between the basic professional ethic as I have depicted it and common notions of morality and fairness. Against the background of the dilemmas I have suggested, legal educators have been reluctant to enter the arena. My prediction is that they will continue to be so.

Luncheon Address

Educational Reform in Underdeveloped Countries

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I

As part of the program of this conference on moral development I have been asked to speak briefly on educational reform in underdeveloped countries.

As morality and morals are commonly understood in individualistic terms, their relation to education may not be readily seen. The actual problems of education in underdeveloped countries are very grave. Their cause is not primarily that education is not more effective there in fostering among the people moral attitudes in the ordinary sense but that education is grossly inadequate from the point of view of promoting development. In many instances, education there is, in fact, miseducation, and its impact is antidevelopmental.

The shortcomings in their educational systems are manifold, as I will discuss later. A main cause, besides poverty, is the selfishness of those in the upper strata of the society who hold power in these countries and do so rather independently of their constitutions. They have not been prepared to take the consequences of the goal of reaching greater equality, which they commonly pronounce. Instead, they have been bent on perpetuating those educational systems that preserve their traditional privileges.

If we are prepared to extend morality from the private to the public sphere, this behavior of the upper classes can certainly be censured as immoral. Economists and other social scientists have commonly tried to shy away from such valuations and have been proud of it, maintaining that a value-free attitude testified to "professionalism." I am, in that sense, an old-fashioned political economist.

I feel that I stand on firm logical ground since valuations are always with us in all research, however purely factual we try to make it look. There must be questions before answers can be given. There is no view except from a viewpoint. In the questions raised and the viewpoint applied, valuations are involved. A disinterested research there has never been and can never be.

The classical and early neo-classical authors founded their thinking on the utilitarian moral philosophy, which was, in turn, founded upon the hedonistic associational psychology. Both are long since outmoded. I have to make my value premises explicit and I have to give rational reasons why I have chosen them.

II

But let me come to the facts. The colonial era ended by leaving the masses of people in the newly independent countries mostly untouched by any formal education. There are exceptions, one of which should be of special interest to my present audience. In its short time as a colonial power in the Philippines, the United States differed from the English, the Dutch, and the French in other parts of South Asia, in that they placed more emphasis on education of the people. Except in the Philippines and in a few other colonies, the main objective was to train a small section of the population to serve as clerks, minor officials of all sorts, and, in the British colonies, even as higher administrative functionaries and—to some extent—as professionals. It is important to state that this interest of the colonial powers was thoroughly shared by the upper strata in the colonies who were eager to avail themselves of the opportunities to profit by serving their masters.

These elite schools were regularly of a "literary" or "academic" type (what is now called "general") more so than their counterparts in the more developed countries at that time. Little attention was given to science and still less to technical subjects. Students commonly expected to be "deskmen" who would not soil their hands. Importance was given to passing examinations and acquiring status; practical training for life and work was ignored.

Wherever there was much of a liberation movement, educational reform stood high on the agenda. And after independence, demands were often raised that the entire system of education should be "revolutionized." But this is exactly what did not happen. The explanation is, of course, that the

coming of independence did not work great changes on the people or their society.

The educational establishment is part of the larger institutional system which includes the social and economic stratification, the distribution of property, and the power relations. It embodies strong vested interests of administrators, teachers, students and, above all, the families in the powerful upper strata who do not want to undermine their position, which is bolstered by the inherited school system.

III

There has been, however, one reform idea continually expressed with seemingly great determination: the extension of popular education and the liquidation of illiteracy. This represents the main—and almost the only—break with the elite ideology from the colonial era. Literacy is needed for acquiring skill in all fields. Moreover, widespread literacy is a prerequisite for any attempt to create an integrated nation with wide participation of the people.

The goal has been limited, however, to primary schools. Unfortunately, this implies downgrading adult education, particularly literacy classes. But such adult education is needed now to help reach universal literacy in the shortest possible time. For another thing, adult education, with emphasis on literacy, could help to make the school education of children more effective. All the information we have suggests that children living in an illiterate surrounding can more easily lapse into illiteracy.

In some underdeveloped countries, efforts have been made to build up adult education. But not much has come out of it. When a country "goes Communist," however, a vigorous literacy campaign is usually waged to make the whole people literate within a few years. There should be nothing sinisterly communistic about this particular policy line.

Meanwhile, in many underdeveloped countries, unemployed high school and university graduates continue to crowd into the cities. It has proved impossible to get them out in the villages and the urban slums to teach the masses of people to read, write, and reckon. Many of the graduates are radical, but they apparently do not identify themselves with the huge underclass.

IV

So far, efforts have been directed toward enlarging, as rapidly as possible, the number of children admitted to primary schools. This means that these countries start out facing great difficulties. For one thing, children of school age form a much larger percentage of the population than in our countries. And there are at the start fewer school buildings, teachers, textbooks, and whoever or whatever else is needed to run schools.

The declared purpose has been to give priority to increasing elementary schooling. What has actually happened in most underdeveloped countries, however, is that the number of students in secondary school has been rising much faster and the number in postsecondary schooling has increased still more rapidly. This has happened in spite of the fact that secondary schooling seems to be three to five times more expensive than primary schooling, and schooling at the tertiary level five to seven times more expensive than at the secondary level. Even more remarkable is the fact that these tendencies seem rather more accentuated in the poorest countries, which start out with many fewer children in primary schools and which should have the strongest reasons to follow out the program of giving primary schooling the highest priority.

When this happens, it implies that the school system has been allowed to let a swelling stream of pupils through the established channels without interfering except by trying to enlarge those channels where the pressure is greatest. Those who can effectively exert pressure are parents in the middle and upper strata. Here we see again how the school system is determined by the inegalitarian economic and social stratification and the unequal distribution of power.

V

I should warn that most of the statistics on education in underdeveloped countries exaggerate the accomplishments of those countries and cannot be used with any confidence. The figures for literacy usually overestimate the actual spread of literacy, particularly if we mean that degree of functional literacy that enables a person to make any use of it in life and work. Likewise, the enrollment figures give an inflated account of school performance, if by that we mean the extent to which children actually attend schools. The bias works most strongly for primary schools and

more strongly for girls than for boys. It is also most accentuated in the poorest districts of the very poor countries.

In South Asia, a large number of children who have enrolled drop out or do not attend school regularly. If they do not drop out, they often become repeaters, which is mostly a prelude to dropping out. In very poor countries such as India or Pakistan, usually fewer than half of those children who originally were enrolled complete primary school. In South Asia, this is called "wastage" and "stagnation."

Irregular attendance, repeating, and dropping out represent a huge waste of resources. If the expenditure for primary schools were expressed in terms of cost per child who successfully completes primary school, it would be much greater than is commonly accounted for. Unfortunately, the cost per pupil so calculated would be particularly high in poorer countries and the rural districts. The wastage is greatest where it can least be afforded.

Far too little attention is still given to this problem. The legislation dealing with compulsory education is seldom enforced. Particularly in the poorer countries and the poorer districts a general lack of efficiency and discipline permeates the whole school system.

In primary schools, the supply of adequate classrooms, textbooks, writing paper, and other kinds of teaching aids is usually very inadequate, though more so in the poorest countries and the poorest regions. There is almost everywhere a lack of properly trained teachers. In most underdeveloped countries, the situation in primary schools—particularly in rural districts and the city slums where the masses live—is almost desperate.

In line with an evil tradition from precolonial and colonial times, and under the other-mentioned limiting conditions, teaching becomes "bookish," even though very few books and little writing paper are available.

VI

Teaching in the secondary schools is usually somewhat better. But the attempts made in some countries to orient teaching to practical life, to impart useful skills, and, in particular, to give more emphasis to vocational and technical education have had relatively little success.

The increase of vocational and technical schools has usually been very small, and almost nowhere has the curriculum of the general secondary

schools, where the larger part of the expansion has taken place, been modernized in any appreciable manner.

This would seem astonishing as there has been agreement among political leaders and experts for a long time that in this respect a radical change was needed. One reason for this conservatism is the scarcity of persons who can teach technical subjects. These people are also needed in government and industry, where, for the most part, they can expect higher salaries and social status than in the schools. Moreover, instruction in sciences and other technical and vocational subjects requires often costly laboratories and other technical aids.

But most important is the heavy weight of tradition from colonial and precolonial times. The dominating upper strata, who are "educated" as the term is used in underdeveloped countries, and articulate, have a vested interest in maintaining the cleft between the educated and the masses. The fact that a more practical vocational orientation in the secondary schools would require participation in manual work, which they despise, and that it would presumably prepare students for jobs in which manual work is part of the routine, has contributed to making such schools less popular with the upper classes than the traditional general ones.

In higher education, as in other areas, the traditional ideas of what upper class elite education should be have intensified the difficulty of changing from the old structure of colonial times to the new. Even more than at the secondary, the schools at the tertiary level should, of course, be job-oriented and directed toward preparing students for particular professions. Nevertheless, they continue to produce an oversupply of generalists trained in the humanities, law, social sciences, and a sort of "academic" science, many of whom come to swell the ranks of underqualified administrators, clerks, and the educated unemployed. Meanwhile, professions such as engineering, medicine, dentistry, pharmacology, and teaching, which need more practitioners, are ignored. Agriculture, by far the most important industry in most underdeveloped countries, is particularly disfavored.

VII

The views I have expressed here are not only my own but are shared by competent observers. Particularly in India there has been much honest and penetrating discussion of the problems, though little action. The excellent *Report of the Education Commission* (3) is outspoken: The educational

system "is tending to widen the gulf between the classes and the masses." The Commission concludes:

> Indian education needs a drastic reconstruction, almost a revolution. . . . This calls for a determined and large-scale action. Tinkering with the existing situation, and moving forward with faltering steps and lack of faith can make things worse than before.

The situation is even worse in Pakistan and not much better in most of the other countries in South Asia. I refer to that huge region of underdeveloped countries whose development problems I have studied intensively (see the last chapters in *Asian Drama* [1] and Chapter 6 in *Challenge of World Poverty* [2]). A more cursory study of the literature has confirmed the impression that almost everywhere in the underdeveloped world the situation is similar. Although there are important differences among individual countries, broadly the picture is very much the same.

In view of the very different historical backgrounds and the many other conditioning factors in Latin America, in West Africa, and in North Africa, the considerable similarities among these countries are surprising. The one underlying common trait is the political domination by a small upper and middle class. The independent African countries south of the Sahara are still in a "becoming born" situation, but there are more than exceptional signs of the establishment of an elite class structure in many of these countries too.

Everywhere greater equality and raising the levels of living of the masses are pronounced as goals and almost everywhere the actual trends have been going towards greater inequality. The developments in the educational field upon which I have focused in this paper fit into that still broader framework.

VIII

I will have to be brief in sketching the reforms needed. The goal to make literacy universal should be taken seriously. Vigorous efforts should be made in adult education. These efforts should be closely related to—and, indeed be an extension of—the activity of the schools. The universities should be engaged in this activity, which should also bring both professors and students nearer the people and their problems.

A main emphasis should be placed on elementary education, and more resources should be devoted to education at this stage. The main emphasis

should be given to raising the qualitative standards of the primary schools. Intensive efforts should be made to decrease the tremendous wastage of dropouts and repeaters.

A crucial task is to increase the number and qualifications of trained teachers. The schools for this training should be the "power plants" that generate moral and intellectual energy among the students to prepare the people for development.

Most underdeveloped countries should try to halt, or at least slow, the rapidly increasing enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools by raising the admission requirements. When I visited India in the spring of 1973, I shuddered when I read in the newspapers that there would be one million more college graduates produced before the end of the decade.

There is no reason why technical, vocational, and professional training should not be increased substantially within the present (or even somewhat smaller) secondary and tertiary education systems, providing more and better graduates for teaching, farming, medical and paramedical work and all the other skills for which trained young people are so urgently needed.

IX

Many other reforms besides educational ones are needed in underdeveloped countries to spur development by decreasing inequality and at the same time increasing productivity. Land reform has almost everywhere been put on the agenda but usually been made a sham. They need to overcome the "soft state," improve their legislation and particularly their administration, and stamp out corruption, which now almost everywhere seems to be increasing. There is a great need for spreading birth control, but a campaign for that purpose will not be effective unless through other reforms the masses are made to feel that they are living in a dynamic society offering them more opportunities to raise their levels of living. All these reforms must be fought for, planned, and acted upon by these countries themselves. There is not much we can do from the outside about reforms relating to the social stratification and the power structure. In the education field, expert advice from foreigners cannot be of great importance, for the main problem does not concern pedagogics. And even their pedagogical problems are essentially different from ours.

We can, of course, aid these countries by placing at their disposal free of charge or at concessional prices all sorts of equipment, by giving aid to the

setting up of modern and effective teachers' training colleges, and even by helping them raise teachers' salaries, which are now often scandalously low. But mostly the reforms have to be radical changes in entire school systems, which can only be engineered from within.

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Afternoon Session

Issues in the Measurement of Moral Development*

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In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says to Callias: "If your two sons were only colts or bullocks we could have hired a trainer for them to make them beautiful and good, and all that they should be; and our trainer would have been, I take it, a horseman or a farmer. But now that they are human beings, have you any trainer in your mind for them? Is there any one who understands what a man and a citizen ought to be?"

The problems of virtue and of moral development are ancient ones. Socrates was a teacher in the mode Professor Trow described, being as much a model as a pedagogue. To be sure, he disregarded the dress code of Athens and was notably untidy. Nor should the outcome of his trial be forgotten, for he was executed for teaching false gods and corrupting the youth.

Dewey and Tufts (2) in their text on *Ethics* maintained that the moral education of Plato and Aristotle was furthered not only by the teachings of Socrates but also by his execution. Once the city fathers had decreed the execution of their beloved teacher, Plato and Aristotle could never again accept authority without question. And once you question authority, you can never again accept the answer that authority must be obeyed just because it is authority. Among the ancient Jews also, as Dewey and Tufts noted, the rulers who insisted most strongly on obedience to authority and on pious adherence to the letter of the law were themselves corrupt and enriched themselves at the expense of the people. Nothing undermines authority so much as its own corruption, venality, and self-interest.

Mr. Kristol and I agree that the model one holds of moral development is consequential for attempts to influence it and for all social applications;

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in addition, I shall try to show that the model is crucial for research and measurement. The model Mr. Kristol and Professor Schwartz adhere to is diametrically opposite to the one I shall defend. Moral development is not a purpose but a by-product of teaching; on this I agree with Professor Trow. The question was raised this morning whether persons with different moral aims can share a common education. I believe not only that they can, but that moral conflict itself can be educational. It is not the answers but the questions asked that both show and stimulate moral development. I shall return to that point.

Models of Moral Development

How one measures moral development depends on the model of moral development one adopts. Some years ago, the Binet-type ability tests, in the glow of their early success, provided a model. That meant moral growth was measured as proportionate achievement of an adult norm or norms specified in advance by the test constructor. If moral development follows the same model as ability development, the same psychometric methods are applicable. There are, however, two other models—the profile model and the stage-sequence model. I wish mainly to present some of the psychometric problems encountered in relation to the stage-sequence conception of moral development.

There is a distinction sometimes made in law between acts that are *malum per se* and those that are *malum prohibitum*, the former indicating moral turpitude, the latter wrong only because there happens to be a law against them in the community. Murder and rape are in the former category, draft card burning and traffic violations in the latter. Although they do not make such fine legal distinctions, children also have their own estimation of the gravity of various offenses. Helping each other on examinations, which adults call "cheating," does not seem to them to be a serious offense, as Piaget and others have shown. For them it is not evil per se but only because adults say so. Hartshorne and May (4), in doing one of the earliest studies of moral development, did not take seriously the child's own moral sensibilities and concentrated on offenses like cheating. To this day, many experimental studies of morality concern themselves with offenses trivial and inconsequential with no moral content whatsoever, such as choosing a smaller and immediate rather than a larger and delayed reward or looking at a toy the experimenter told them not to look at. There are, of course, ethical objections to putting children in situations

where they are tempted to commit serious offenses, but psychologists could at least be sensitive to the triviality of the transgressions from which they infer moral development.

The Piagetian revolution has been profound, though it is not universally accepted. There are at least two ways that Piaget has influenced measurement of moral development: through the methods by which he studied moral judgment and through his concept of stages. Piaget (11) reversed the approach to moral development of Hartshorne and May. He deliberately picked as his paradigmatic topic the game of marbles, where there was no adult code to inculcate because no one over the age of 12 or so paid any attention to it. Thus, he was enabled to study the natural history of the child's morality without contamination by bits and pieces of adult-imposed rules. In relation to intellectual development more than in relation to moral development, Piaget introduced the idea of stages, each having its own structure and equilibrium. No single action or utterance but the structure of the child's whole thought is the clue to his stage. Kohlberg's (6) work on moral development derives from the Piagetian revolution, and I will return to discuss its psychometric problems.

Hogan's (5) work represents a third model of moral development, alternative to the cumulative ability paradigm of Binet and the stage-sequence paradigm of Kohlberg. Hogan's model is built on a factorial paradigm. For Hogan there are five independent elements contributing to moral maturity: moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and a unique fifth dimension, ethics of conscience versus ethics of responsibility. There are quasi-stages in the maturation of some of these dimensions, but they occur in no fixed order. Hogan's model is an elaboration of the original ability-type model to five dimensions, and he uses ability-type, cumulative tests, often of an objective format, to measure his five dimensions. That is, typically he either counts the number of items answered "correctly" or counts the number of occurrences of some favorable signs.

A Confusion of Models

Traditional psychometrics, worked out for ability and achievement tests, can be adapted to tests of moral development if one adheres to an ability-type model. If, however, one accepts the Piagetian revolution, then a new or adapted psychometrics is required. Instead, what is least acceptable often occurs, an unconsidered confusion of models. An example is taking each stage in a sequence of stages and treating it as a polar (that is,

ability-type) variable, to be measured by an ability-type test. That kind of confusion can be found in the work of Kohlberg, of Peck and Havighurst (10), and the California group of which Marguerite Warren is one of the best-known members. Both Peck and Havighurst and the California group have devised separate tests for the several stages, as if the stages coexisted as a kind of stage profile. Now the profile is a possible model; it is essentially Hogan's model. But the stage sequence and the profile are essentially incompatible as models for measurement.

No one denies that every person's behavior can be expected to exhibit much variability. The task of measurement is to reduce the variability to a pattern. There are two steps: first, translating the qualitative observations into quantitative ones and, second, reducing the several observations to one score or a small set of scores. In that process, one must be guided by some model of how things are, some picture of phenotype and genotype. Phenotypic behavioral diversity is compatible with genotypic assignment to a single stage. Warren and Kohlberg appear to think in terms of stage assignment, but Peck and Havighurst are not clear on the matter.

In Kohlberg's work, each element of a subject's response is rated as being some stage. (Different versions of his scoring manual define the elements differently.) Thus, the number of elements at one stage and that at the other stages are not independent events; they are experimentally dependent. The subject's responses are distributed among the stages. There is a world of psychometric difference between a profile and a distribution, though to the unwary they may look alike on a piece of paper. Kohlberg sometimes treats the distribution of responses as if it were a profile, sometimes even correlating the stages. To do so, he takes the frequency of scores at each stage as if it were a score in a profile of independent stage scores. Then he correlates the stages. On this basis he has stated that his stages form a Guttman simplex. But the operations by which he so concluded—correlating stages—are meaningless, a confusion of models.

If we adhere to the stage model for moral development, as I do, and as Kohlberg and Warren also claim to do, we are not thereby committed to ignoring the inevitable, obdurate diversity of human behavior. We must not, however, confuse phenotype with genotype. As Egon Brunswik (3) pointed out, there is only a probabilistic relation between an inferred characteristic of a person (in this case character type) and particular behaviors from which it is inferred, always fallibly, to be sure. Those probabilities may not be very high, in part because many diverse propensities influence each action (in principle, everything about a person influences each of his actions), in part because different situations elicit

different propensities, as Mischel (9) often reminds us. The patent diversity of conduct does not establish or disestablish any conceptual model. The question of what serves as evidence for or against a model is complex; I doubt that there is or can be definitive evidence and I do not rule out the psychologist's temperament as a factor in making a choice between the ability model, the factorial model, and the stage-sequence model.

The Stage-Sequence Model

Let me elaborate for a moment on the stage-sequence model of child development, then tell you some of the ways those who accept it differ among themselves. According to this model, the child's thought has a structure (or some structures). The structure his thought already has acts as a templace for current perceptions and thoughts. It constitutes his frame of reference. There is an inner logic to mental structure; that is what constitutes it as a structure, gives it coherence, unity, and stability. Changes—that is, development—of mental structures are, as a consequence, slow; the changes also have a pattern, an inner logic, or structure. They differ from learning certain set patterns of response in that they tend to be irreversible. Along with the stability, there is also an internal dynamic. Normal, healthy children reach out to new things, pace themselves with problems a little difficult for their current capacities. Children follow a more or less uniform pattern in their acquisition of concepts like those referring to dreams or to the conservation of volume. Those patterns are the result of the inner logic of development, not of rewards and punishments. With an appropriate schedule of reinforcement you can teach a child to give the "right" answer to a question on dreams or on conservation of volume before he has acquired the corresponding mental structure. For that reason, Piaget chose to study just those topics that children had not likely been coached on by adults. Moreover, his interview method is designed to guard against children accepting suggestions or spinning fantasies and to probe the inner structure of the child's thought. Whether Piaget and his coworkers are successful is not the point here. That is their aim and their conception. Specific, rigidly defined behaviors are not taken as reliable indicators of the structure of thought; that can only be inferred from the whole pattern.

Piaget had only one extended foray into the field of moral development, recorded in his 1932 book *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. That essay,

though flawed by Piaget's own prejudices and some too hasty conclusions, has enormously influenced a whole contemporary school, a school that I call developmental characterology. The central theme comes from another great theorist, Harry Stack Sullivan: Major character types are both a chief dimension of individual differences and the enduring trace of a developmental sequence. In Sullivan's words, "Everyone is much more simply human than otherwise, and. . . anomalous interpersonal situations, insofar as they do not arise from differences in language or custom, are a function of differences in the relative maturity of the persons concerned" (12). The major points in that deceptively simple sentence are as follows: Sullivan believed that the most important aspects of human personality and hence of psychology and psychiatry are those that refer to interpersonal relations. Second, he believed that there is just one pattern for normal development of the major aspects of the capacity for interpersonal relations with a fairly limited number of normal and abnormal variants on it. Third, despite the fact that the major outlines of personality develop according to a single sequence, there are wide individual differences; they are accounted for by the stage in the sequence one has reached at a given age. Fourth, most difficulties between people are a function of those differences in stage.

The idea of stage, which is vague and intuitive in most writers, is developed by Piaget and Inhelder in their work on cognitive development as having the following characteristics: First, there is an invariable sequence; no stage can be skipped. Second, each stage builds on, incorporates, and transmutes the previous stage and prepares for the next stage. Third, there is an inner logic and equilibrium, as we have just discussed.

Curiously, Piaget did not believe that there are real stages in moral development, but in any case, that field was never his *metier*. Kohlberg, using elements of Piaget's methods and reasoning, has derived his stages as much from the social psychologist William McDougall as anyone. Roughly, the stages can be divided into preconventional, conventional-conformist, and postconventional.

Among those who have evolved developmental characterologies, different names have been given to the dimension in accord with what was seen as the central conceptual focus. For Kohlberg, for Peck and Havighurst, and others, the central focus is moral development. For some other theorists, the central focus is growth in capacity for interpersonal relations. For some others, the central phenomenon is increased capacity for inner life, a kind of internalization, or in Murray's term, "growth of intraception." Yet each theorist, as he describes the various stages,

encroaches on the domain of the others. One cannot fully describe the character types with respect to moral development without describing also their interpersonal development and their inner life. One cannot fully describe interpersonal development without saying something about moral development and capacity for inner life, and so on. Although each author has his own small details that are different from those of other authors, these sequences are too much alike to be independent facets of growth. The proliferation of developmental sequences with different names and different specifics yet covering the same areas of life is confusing to those interested in following the latest research in the field. Left to their natural dispositions, most of the authors would gather sympathetic cohorts around them and develop their own theory, methods, and body of data in isolation.

Kohlberg, Marguerite Warren, and I have sought to build some bridges. Kohlberg's formula is that cognitive development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of ego development, which, in turn, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of moral development. My formula is that while a certain minimum intellectual development is necessary for the corresponding stage of ego development, that is hardly ever the limiting factor. Moral development, interpersonal development, development of self-concept and inner life proceed together as a single, integrated structure. The apparent differences obtained by different investigators are the result of technical differences in their methods, intrinsic difficulties in measuring developmental variables, some errors such as confusion of, or inappropriate, models, and the ineluctable, ineradicable variety of human ways, that most vexing and most lovable characteristic of the human species. The key to the differences is that between an enduring disposition and a particular response specified in advance there is almost never a high correlation, almost always a very low one. That is why psychologists like Mischel can maintain that there are virtually no enduring dispositions, contrary to what we all base our lives on. I believe that in measuring ego development, I am measuring moral development. Since in any case, the formal aspects of the measurement issues are the same, I shall proceed on that basis.

Measuring Ego Development

In measuring abilities and ability-type variables, the basic operation is usually counting—that is, counting the number of right answers or the

number of occurrences of favorable responses. By contrast, in measuring the development of a sequence of structures, the basic operation is matching—matching a particular response to a sequence of qualitative descriptions of those stage structures and their manifestations. That is the technique of the published scoring manual for measuring ego development from sentence completions (8) and for Kohlberg's unpublished scoring manual for measuring moral development, as well as for some other similar scoring manuals, mostly unpublished. There is a major difference between the way our scoring manual was evolved and that by which Kohlberg's was worked out. Kohlberg believes that he can plumb the depths of each stage structure. Therefore, the logic of those structures enables him to classify each response in the proper stage. I believe, on the other hand, that that kind of reasoning, though necessary for beginning to construct a scoring manual, is also fallible. Therefore, we rely heavily on data to extend and improve our scoring manual. The central operation of our manual construction is the method of internal consistency. If the whole test protocol of a person is given a certain rating, we seek to bring as many as possible of his item ratings into line with that total protocol rating: The operation must take place for hundreds of cases simultaneously, and, of course, it provides information only for responses that occur in the same or similar form on a number of protocols. The specifics of the method have been published elsewhere (7).

Three rules have governed our manual construction project: Rate every response. Justify every scoring decision both theoretically and empirically. And write everything down. None of these rules can be adhered to completely or easily, but as aims they have been immensely important and the source of the fruitfulness of our enterprise. Let me give you a glimpse of how they work, which will also provide a glimpse of some of the technical aspects of measurement and research in this field.

To our astonishment, an early study showed that our raters did not agree on how many subjects had simply omitted a response to some items—that is, failed to complete certain sentence stems. For example, some subjects reply with a question mark, or part of a sentence, or perhaps a couple of words; some raters call that an omission, some call it a response. That taught us that we needed to codify carefully and to write down how such cases should be treated in order that raters treat them uniformly. Also, we had to have a kind of wastebasket rating to cover omissions and unratable answers. Many kinds of answers that we at first thought were unratable, or that gave no information about ego level, we have learned are about as good as those we were sure we could read. That is something we would

never have learned if we had not been forced to rate everything rather than declaring some responses unratable. For example, some authors consider cliches unratable, but we find them reliable indicators of conformist and sometimes of preconformist levels, depending on the content of the cliche. Some fragmentary and illogical responses are characteristic for low ego levels. Other responses that do not form complete sentences but that convey clearly a feeling of tone and part of an idea appropriate to a high level are so rated, disregarding the grammatical incompleteness.

The rule to write everything down may seem simple-minded and trivial, but I credit it for most of what we have achieved. We have gone so far at times as to forbid talking shop to new assistants in order to test whether our written program of self-instruction will result in raters able to make accurate and reliable ratings. Our experimental results were spectacularly favorable, though the raters involved may have been especially gifted persons. By objective measures, the best rater was a college sophomore who had taken no courses in psychology. By publishing a written program of self-instruction, we have made our training technique explicit and available to the professional public. Thus, we have avoided the difficulties of the lengthy personal apprenticeship necessary to learn to score projective tests such as Kohlberg's test of moral judgment or Rorschach's test. A frequent and worse outcome is loss of a scoring technique, as has occurred when groups such as the Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1) group dispersed without having made fully explicit some rating techniques they had worked out together with their staff.

Some of the reasons why writing everything down is a good idea are as follows: First, different people may have different ideas in mind during a conversation about a scoring rule and simply talk past each other without realizing it, believing they have reached agreement when, in fact, they have misunderstood each other. Second, in order to write down an instruction, you have to be clear in your own mind about what you are saying. Third, the rater who has written instructions has something to go back to in case he gets mixed up or meets new and difficult cases. Fourth, when making a final written report of a project, the written record is invaluable. In fact, we try to adhere to the rule to put everything in writing, even instructions to typists on typing manuscripts and instructions for research tasks such as constructing rosters of data or assigning code numbers.

One of the rating problems that we struggled with for years is instructive—that is, the question of what to do when a person gives two answers to a given sentence stem, each of which can be rated separately. Our first rule was that two answers at the conformist level (for example) are still a

conformist answer, but we became aware of more and more complex exceptions. We always believed we understood each other on what rule to follow, but attempts to put those rules into writing proved disastrously unintelligible for years. Without going into all the details of how every possible contingency is handled, let me give you a single example. The sentence stem is "My conscience bothers me if. . ." To orient you, at the preconformist levels, a person might respond, "I steal." A typical response at the early conformist level is "I lie." Among late conformists, the typical response is "I hurt someone's feelings." To say "I hurt someone intentionally" is, however, a postconformist response. A response that seems to be diametrically opposite, "I offend someone unintentionally," is, in fact, given the same rating and for the same reason—it expresses the relation of intention to the judgment of the conscience. Now consider the response "I willfully or unwillfully hurt anyone." That response is given a higher postconformist rating than either of its components—that is, saying I hurt someone willfully (on purpose) or I hurt someone unwillfully (unintentionally). Logically, the combined response "willfully or unwillfully" might be construed as taking us back to the late conformist response "I hurt someone's feelings" since doing it willfully or unwillfully exhausts the alternatives. However, a different conceptual structure is implied. The conformist may worry about hurting someone's feelings, but not simultaneously consider his own intention. What the combined response seems to imply is that while it is reasonable to take intention into account in judging the gravity of an offense, the respondent's own conscience gave her no respite. Good intentions are an excuse, she recognizes, but they do not allay her own guilt feelings. Thus, this response illustrates a rule we have found to hold generally: Where a compound response made up of two responses separately scored at a given level generates a new idea at a higher level of conceptual complexity, we rate the compound response a step higher than its constituent elements. There is a great deal of evidence in our data for the validity of that rule.

My final point, and it brings us back to our starting point of theories and models of character development, is that this finding suggests one theoretical conclusion relating to the process of development. Diametrically opposite ideas are consonant with a given ego level. Thus, some persons may go back and forth between them. They may ask: Which is worse, hurting someone intentionally or unintentionally? Does it matter, if the hurt is the same? Isn't someone who hurts other people unintentionally often just as inconsiderate of them as those who hurt on purpose? And so on. Such juxtapositions may be one means by which deeper moral insights

are generated. That conclusion is consistent with some of Piaget's findings on the growth of the concept of conservation. Give a child two equal balls of plasticene, then roll one out long and thin and ask which is larger. The small child may indicate one "because it is longer" or the other "because it is fatter." When he is able to keep the two dimensions in mind simultaneously (longer and thinner is equivalent to shorter and fatter), he is developing conservation. Our results suggest that a similar process, simultaneously holding in mind opposite ideas or opposing solutions to a problem, may be one way of achieving moral or ego growth. Thus, measurement serves not simply as a technique but as a means to advance theory.

That brings us back also to the question of practical applications to problems of education. I stated at the beginning that a clash of moral opinions is compatible with sharing a common education. More than that, it may be helpful to moral education; indeed, it may be the very essence of it.

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The Role of the School in Moral Development

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Any discussion of moral development in tomorrow's America must inevitably contemplate the role of schools in the moral education of the young because the moral attitudes prevailing in America's third century will at least in part be predicated upon what happens in our schools today. If the battles of England were won on the playing fields of Eton, the present moral tone of America was set in the classrooms of our local schools over the past decades and there it will continue to be set in the years to come.

As I read my morning newspapers, I often wonder where we as educators went astray a half century ago and how we might rectify our errors today lest we fail to meet the challenge which lies before us. I am certain that most of our citizens are asking much the same questions, not as a matter of historical interest, but from a growing desire to effect improvements in educational practices.

I am reminded that "... in time of crises," as T. Bentley Edwards (2) has said, "people and governments usually prod their schools. They do this in a variety of ways. One usual reaction is to begin a censure of teachers. Another common response is to engage in criticism of what schools are teaching. Socrates, accused of inappropriate pedagogy, was actually put to death." Edwards used these words recently in commenting upon revision of the curriculum to meet social and economic change. But his words are equally applicable to the crises of public and private morality which are upon us now.

Fortunately for all of us in modern education who would avoid the fate of Socrates–but, perhaps, unfortunately for society–the time gap between the teaching of precepts of moral behavior and the actual moral practices of those who have been taught is measured in years, even in decades. Just as those responsible for the early moral education of today's leaders have

not disappeared, so, too, we may be long gone from the classroom and the reach of public censure before our mistakes become evident.

If we look back, pondering the mistakes of others, we find that citizens of the 1920s reacted to the crises of that period—flaming youth, gangland murders, bootlegging, Teapot Dome scandals, "Palmer Raids," white-sheeted night riders, and general disrespect for the law—with grave concern for the effectiveness of character education in the public schools. There had been character education enough; nonetheless, educators responded to the public's demands by placing even heavier emphasis upon forming character through school experiences. The school children of that decade were expected to develop a deep and abiding respect for moral and spiritual values. They were *taught* the difference between right and wrong. They were *taught* respect for the law. They were *taught* honesty, integrity, and responsibility. Whether the teaching would be effective was another matter. I think that for some of them it was. For others, it assuredly was not.

Where are the students of the twenties and thirties who were *taught* the difference between right and wrong—where are those people now, when we need them to lead us out of this present swamp of immoral behavior? Where are those boys and girls who were *taught* respect for the law, for truth, for honesty, for honor, and for justice? Many appear to have become adults who learned a very different code.

And what has happened between the teaching of the 1920s and the practice of the 1970s? What progress have we made in the control of crime? What progress have we made in maintenance of the stability of the family? What progress have we made in ensuring that the rule of law is applied with evenhanded justice? What progress have we made in strengthening the moral fiber of those who govern? What progress have we made in establishing the brotherhood of man?

As Superintendent of Public Schools in California, I must ask myself these questions. But if I am to discharge my responsibility to the millions of children who pass through our public schools on their way to shape the future of this nation, I must ask—and answer—the far more difficult questions: "What is the role and the responsibility of the public school in moral development? And why did that past ambitious attempt at character formation yield such inconclusive results?"

I think we may conclude from our experience over the past half century that *teaching* moral values as copybook maxims is not the role the school should play in moral development. We have learned that teaching or preaching is not enough. Values and principles, if they are to guide

behavior, must be assimilated into the personality and comprehended as an inherent part of daily life. Moral teaching must be internalized by the student if it is to have lasting effect.

I would like to suggest for your consideration that the school has not one, but two concurrent roles to play in moral development. One of these roles is as developer of unifying values; the other, as developer of individual values.

Developing the Moral Personality

These are not easy roles to perform in a diverse and complex society at a time when principles are no more certain as guides than are proverbs; for each maxim learned, another, as we know, makes an exception; moreover, they would not be easy roles to perform at any time, because there are extreme difficulties inherent in developing the moral personality.

As Fred Mahler has argued, more is involved in developing the moral personality than the simple transmission of moral precepts from adult to child. Mahler (5) concludes, on the basis of recent research, that:

> The moral personality can be reduced neither to the mechanical sum of previous experience nor to a vague synthesis of future possibilities: it is the ever-dynamic sphere of the permanent options of the individual, whose innate aptitudes change—sometimes radically—in the course of his life in consequence of the education he receives and his encounters with the realities, standards, values, and ideals of society. . .

If Mahler is correct—and common sense suggests he is—we must concern ourselves with the child not simply as a member of the school community but as a member of the total community as well. We must concern ourselves with the experiences he has encountered in the past, is encountering in the present, and may encounter in the future—experiences which will reflect the child's family influences, his cultural and religious background, and his social and economic status.

We are thus faced with a problem which has complexities far beyond the reach of the traditional teaching of basic skills. We are forced to realize that we can no more develop comprehension of moral values in our youth without concerning ourselves with the context of society than we can impart comprehension of the tides without reference to the moon. Does this mean that the school should refuse to try to develop a comprehension of moral values because formal education is only a small part of the total social context of the child? Should the school simply be the value-neutral

purveyor of cognitive skills, while it leaves moral education to the family, the church, and the community?

I cannot believe that an institution which transcends the diversity of American society, serving rich, poor, middle-class, majority, and minority alike, should be forced to ignore the values which give direction to thought and action.

In the words of John Dewey, "What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography and history, to win ability to read and write, if, in the process, the individual loses his own soul; loses appreciation of things worthwhile. . .?" (4).

In spite of the difficulty, the school must take for itself in large measure the responsibility for developing in our young a unifying set of values for a diverse society, values which will bind us together as a nation, permitting us to live together, today and tomorrow, as "one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all."

Our public schools are the one place in our society where every child, regardless of his cultural background, his religious beliefs, or his socio-economic status, comes to learn the rights, responsibilities, and appreciation of a "thing worthwhile"—our common citizenship. Inherent in that citizenship are three of the basic moral values of man—freedom, justice, and brotherhood. These values transcend cultural identity, religious belief, or social class and unify us as people. How could schools escape responsibility for such a fundamental concern of society?

It goes without saying that the family, the church, and the community share responsibility for moral development. But if we are to fulfill the moral promise of this nation, each institution must contribute that which it is uniquely capable of contributing. The school can unify those offerings. The school's concern should be to recognize, treasure, and transmit all that reflects our cultural and religious backgrounds.

Developing Individual Values

The second role which the school must play in moral development is that of developing values which contribute to the fulfillment of the intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual.

While we cannot separate the individual from his social context or from his role within the larger group, we can—and we must—be certain that he learns to value the self he alone is. Inherent in being true to one's self are two basic moral values: truth and integrity—values which transcend

cultural background and sectarian religious belief, values which transcend national identity and bind us together as man. What nation, what culture denies that the educational process, whatever form it takes, shares responsibility for developing individual integrity and self-esteem?

Again, I do not deny that church, community, and family share responsibility for moral development. The church, family, and community have their particular concerns for aspects of the moral personality; the school's concern is to provide the daily experiences which meld those aspects into self-knowledge and self-esteem. The school is the testing and validating laboratory for principles of moral behavior.

If we accept the dual roles of the school in moral development and the assertion that moral development of the individual must take place within the context of society, then how can the school effectively perform those roles so that the children of today are prepared to make the serious moral judgments which will face society in the twenty-first century?

Science promises us the ability to create life in the future and to alter genetic patterns. Scientists have already made it possible for us to destroy not only all mankind but the planet itself. The future holds the possibility of mass starvation in the midst of plenty, of germ warfare, of planned genocide. The future is in every sense a "loaded weapon." Do we dare place that weapon in the hands of citizens who might lack the moral courage to challenge leaders who have forfeited moral values? Surely we have seen how willingly man may accede to evil means for what he has been falsely told are good ends. We have witnessed the horrors of the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Dachau perpetrated by "good" citizens. We have seen the massacres of Mai Lai. We have seen the dogs of Selma. We have seen the human misery which follows corruption of power. We need no more evidence to tell us that our schools must inculcate integrity, bridging the gap between true moral precept and accepted immoral practice and between man and his fellowman.

How Can Schools Inculcate Integrity?

Yet, if the schools *must*, how shall they do it? I have no simple answers. But I do offer some suggestions which seem to hold promise of greater effectiveness than the practice of *teaching* moral principles as we have done in the past.

First, I suggest we recognize that moral development is not a subject to be taught as we teach the cognitive skills of reading, writing, or arithmetic.

Values, morals—call them what you will—must not be reserved for discussion in some separate period of the day or week or incorporated into some arbitrary course of social studies. Just as the need for moral decisions occurs at unexpected times in our daily lives, so must opportunities to demonstrate or illustrate moral values to be taken whenever or however they arise. When a teacher explaining addition or subtraction tells of counting her change at the supermarket, finding she has received too much, and pondering what to do—when she shares the inner pilgrimage of how she came to her decision in time of moral dilemma—she provides a lesson in moral development. When the spelling lesson defines value words, the children learn concepts of right and wrong along with correct orthography. When the science lesson tells of Galileo's moral courage in returning to teaching that the sun, not the earth, is the center of the universe, the children have the opportunity to explore what Louis Rath calls "the valuing processes of prizing, choosing, and acting" (4).

The codified approach to moral instruction must be accompanied by integrity and mellowed by openness and personalizing. Children are quick to sense the hypocrisy of separating moral principles from accepted practice. They want to walk with us as we make our moral choices, not meet us at the gate to receive the distilled wisdom of our experiences. Why is it that the same educators who are convinced of the necessity of "hands-on" experience in learning occupational skills find no reason for "hands-on" experiences in moral development? I have found that the best moral guidelines are not those prepared by learned men but those distilled from our own experience—the guidelines which permit us to sleep with a clear conscience.

Second, and of equal importance in making certain that concern for moral development permeates the curriculum, is the necessity that good moral behavior permeate the administration of school affairs.

Our California Administrative Code (1) sets forth the code of ethics for the teaching profession in our state. The preamble to that code states:

> The educator believes in the worth and dignity of man. He recognizes the supreme importance of the pursuit of truth, devotion to excellence, and the nurture of democratic citizenship. He regards as essential to these goals the protection of the freedom to learn and to teach and the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for all. The educator accepts his responsibility to practice his profession according to the highest ethical standards. . . .

There follow three principles: The first is a commitment to the student. "The educator," the code declares, "measures his success by the progress

of each student toward realization of his potential as a worthy and effective citizen." The second is a commitment to the public. "The educator," the code continues, "believes that democratic citizenship in its highest form requires dedication to the principles of our democratic heritage." The third, and last, is a commitment to the profession. "The educator believes that the quality of the services of the education profession directly influences the nation and its citizens. He, therefore, exerts every effort to raise his professional standards, to improve his service."

It is worthy of note that this code of ethics puts *commitment to the student before commitment to the public or to the teaching profession.*

Over the years, teachers have done a far better job of defining their status relative to nonteachers than they have in defining their professional standards of quality control. Their reluctance to engage in self-policing has made them suspect in the eyes of students and citizens alike. Moral modeling, that essential ingredient of moral development, is difficult to take seriously when those who ought to be the models, and ought to be taking responsibility for the integrity of their peers, are all in a covered wagon circle, protecting the profession against attack.

Unlike teachers, school administrators and school governing boards have no code of ethics which has the force of law. However, in the *Handbook on the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of School Personnel and Students in the Areas of Moral and Civic Education and Teaching about Religion* (1), adopted by the California State Board of Education last year, there are sections which suggest that the structures and activities of the school should incorporate constitutional principles and democratic processes. The guidelines state, "All school personnel, not just classroom teachers, should cultivate fair and open procedures and democratic learning. Their own attitudes and behavior, empathy with students, fair standards of evaluation, and calm and judicious administration of discipline may be more eloquent lessons in democratic living than any number of oral or written exercises can provide."

The guidelines call for fair and open enforcement of rules, student rights to representation and participation in school governance, and student rights to free expression of deeply held views as well as student exercise of rational persuasion.

Administrators have all too frequently substituted devotion to efficiency for devotion to meeting the needs or respecting the rights of children. Standards for citizenly behavior can only be nurtured in a favorable climate. We know that we cannot inculcate obedience to authority, respect for law, or empathy for others through a strap applied to the backside of a

nonbeliever. We are aware that student participation in the discipline process is a more effective training experience for moral decision making than corporal punishment, suspension, or expulsion; yet we permit the presumable administrative efficiency of authoritarianism to preclude that kind of "wasteful" experimenting which democracy in action requires.

Boards of education are frequently more concerned with questions of conflict of interest than they are with demonstrations of moral courage. Does this make them valuable overseers of our schools? Are they helping to train the sort of leaders we need? John Kennedy in his book *Profiles in Courage* (3) quoted John Adams' observation: "It is not true, in fact, that any people ever love the public better than themselves." And then Kennedy went on to ask if that were true, what had caused statesmen who had demonstrated moral courage to act as they did? He answered his question by saying: "It was not because they loved the public better than themselves. On the contrary, it was because they *loved themselves.* Because each one's need to maintain his self-respect was more important to him than his popularity with others—because his desire to win or maintain a reputation for integrity and courage was stronger than his desire to maintain his office. . ." (p. 294).

Third, positive reinforcement should be practiced by teachers and administrators as the basic way of encouraging moral behavior among youngsters. Too often we have tried to develop positive behavior by negative means. To expand on that idea, let me go back for a moment to the role of the school as a unifying force in moral development.

The basic documents of our nation call for citizen participation in government. Those documents—our Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—give us both rights and responsibilities which stem from the fundamental beliefs of the authors in three basic moral values of man: freedom, justice, and brotherhood. We cannot expect a student to function as a responsible, "choosing, prizing, and acting" citizen at age 18 when his sole knowledge of rights, responsibilities, freedom, justice, and brotherhood has come from negative experiences—from punishment for breaking rules he had no voice in making, from school courses and future occupations chosen for him, from uneven justice for antisocial behavior, from teachers' or administrators' ridicule of individuals, and from too frequent evidence that "good guys finish last." We cannot expect such a student to act as the man of upright virtue, and, in most instances, he does not. Society is overrun with "educated" persons who have never known the opportunity to discover what is important to them, never learned to set priorities, never calculated what they are for or

against. We are surrounded by those who have not been encouraged to affirm their moral decisions publicly, who have not experienced the need to examine the consequences of behavior or to accept the responsibility for the consequences after choosing a course of action, and who have never been encouraged to live by their convictions. In the absence of positive reinforcement of moral behavior, is it any wonder that everywhere about us we see abuses of power by public officials and private corporations, uneven justice, and perpetrated outrages over school integration or the abolition of restrictive covenants on real estate or the establishment of affirmative action employment programs? We may safely conclude from observations of behavior that freedom, justice, and brotherhood are not the most closely held values in today's society.

Fourth, we cannot expect the school to discharge its responsibility for developing values contributory to building individual self-esteem without some reappraisal of teacher behavior and community standards. Morality is a habit as well as a deliberate practice. Daily attention to moral conduct in small details must be encouraged as a way of developing a pattern that will help with more serious moral judgments. But how do we encourage attention to small details or large judgments when even the most aberrant behavior is condoned by teachers fearful of parental criticism or community pressure?

The Power of Community Pressures

Teachers are not lacking in moral standards, and in the main, they are bound by codes of ethical conduct, violation of which subjects them to dismissal. There is, however, for many teachers, a timidity about being involved in saying anything which might be construed as controversial. Questions of what constitutes a standard of moral behavior are tricky indeed, and fearful of being caught in a riptide of values, teachers find it safer to follow the way of the world. Cheating is ignored in the classroom because the teacher knows that beyond the school fence, the crime lies not in cheating, but in getting caught. Disregard of the truth is condoned because the teacher knows that mendacity speaks louder to society than does veracity. An affluent society is flattered even when conned by constant lies and false promises. Acceptance of the intrinsic worth of the individual human being and concern for preserving his integrity are subordinated to normalizing him to accord with the public frenzy for standardization. Because of countervailing community pressures, teachers

model values they only half accept—or even reject—in the privacy of their own souls.

I suggest that the student is more eager to search for truth than his teachers realize and more subject to conflicts in the morally lax classroom than he would be in the morally firm one. He needs honest space within which to grow, not spurious freedom from standards. Free discussion in the classroom of options, alternatives, and consequences would involve the student in the problem solving and decision making which lead to one's formulating his own moral principles, and would serve him far better than easy coverups. There is a sense of personal accountability in all of us. It needs freedom to grow and develop and reinforcement and support until it reaches maturity. When the teacher establishes and maintains a climate in which personal rectitude can mature, conflicts between desirable principles and reasonable practices are likely to be resolved. The principles dictate ethical practices.

I think that neither teachers nor administrators should overrate community pressure as a deterrent to ideal standards of moral behavior. In spite of our diversity, there are moral guideposts which our society universally accepts. They are evident in the moral outrage with which society recently responded to the egregious examples of justice mishandled.

A slender but firm golden thread of integrity does, in fact, bind us together. If it sometimes seems to disappear in the complicated pattern of life, we can find it by more scrupulous discernment. Our schools must make certain that each new generation of students knows of that golden thread and of their responsibility to trace its course anew. The role of the school in moral development is to be exemplary of the best in our culture, not only by cherishing the values it would have cherished by students, but by doing unto others as it would have them also do.

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